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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
Commodity market stabilization, has received a great deal of 
attention in the literature, since the first theoretical analysis of 
market stabilization developed by Waugh in 1944. The sources of market 
instability can be categorized as either trend factors or unpredictable 
shift factors. Growth in income, technological improvements, or changes 
in consumer tastes result in gradual shifts in demand and supply, while 
variations in climate, diseases, and pest outbreaks, and in some 
countries input availability, lead to sudden supply shifts. It is the 
instability resulting from the latter group of shift factors that is of 
major concern to policy makers because of its unpredictable nature. 
Hence, economic analyses in this area has concentrated on the impacts of 
instability resulting from these stochastic factors. 
In a world of open economies, instability from the above factors can 
be compounded or moderated through trade. The effects of trade on 
international market stability are best illustrated by the events of 
1972-1974 in the world grain market. Prior to 1972, the world grain 
market was characterized by large surplus reserves in the major exporting 
countries, mainly the United States, Canada, and later Australia. The 
Soviet Union and China had little, if any, participation in the market. 
Between 1972 and 1974, production shortfalls due to draughts in the 
Soviet Union, Asia, and the Sahael increased the volume of world grain 
trade. Import demand of the U.S.S.R., in particular, rose sharply 
because of their desire to meet production shortfalls, as well as build 
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stocks. The enlarged export market depleted reserves in the U.S. and 
Canada. Prices increased sharply, and concessional exports to developing 
countries were virtually eliminated. In addition to the natural- factors, 
OPEC oil price increases and devaluations of the Canadian and U.S. 
dollars boosted grain prices even further. These events of the 1972-1974 
period resulted in an awakening of governments or policy makers to a need 
to protect their interâal markets from shortages, as well as severe 
internal price variations. Individual countries now relied on trade to 
adjust to internal supply and demand conditions. This undoubtedly led to 
the high world price variability in the middle to later 1970s. 
Johnson (1975) was probably the first to recognize that one country 
can achieve market stability at the expense of more instability in the 
rest of the world. One reason he cites for the difference in price 
behavior between the 1960s and 1970s is that in the latter period, a 
larger percentage of the world grain production and consumption occurred 
as a result of policies designed to achieve internal price stability 
through the control of imports and exports. For example. the Soviet 
Union had the same basic policy in 1960 and 1972, in terms of fixing both 
consumer and producer prices. However, in 1972, greater attempts were 
made at making the fixed prices effective in the sense of equating supply 
and demand. The shortfall in supply in this year had to be compensated 
for through trade. Johnson further notes that although world prices were 
more stable in the 1960s than in the 1970s, aggregate world production in 
the latter period was actually more stable. 
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Since Johnson's paper, the literature includes several analyses on 
the impacts of individual country policies on the stability of other 
markets. A discussion of these analyses is presented in a latter 
section. For now, it is only recognized that though supply variability 
due largely to fluctuations in output (caused by natural phenomena) and 
demand variability may be the initial cause of market instability, these 
may not be the only ones in an interrelated world. 
In most grain exporting regions, the major objectives of farm 
policies are to stabilize and support farm income. This objective has 
been the principal motivation for the development of current domestic 
policies of the major participants in the international grain market; 
examples being the United States, Canada, Australia, and the European 
Community (E.G.). The effects of high domestic price supports are an 
increase in production and a decrease in consumption. Trade linkages 
with the international market provide a means for disposing of any 
resulting surpluses. Furthermore, variability in production, given fixed 
internal prices, implies a greater variability in export supplies and 
import demands and, therefore, a destabilizing effect on world markets. 
Policies that insulate domestic prices from the unstable world market, 
such as the E.E.C.'s variable levy policy, reduce the elasticity of world 
excess demand, hence increasing the impact on price variability of supply 
and demand shocks. Policy induced market instability is, thus, a 
potential problem for the international community. 
The desirability of market stability for producers and consumers has 
been widely studied. For consumers, more stable markets reduce risk 
4 
of occurrence of high consumer prices and their inflationary consequences 
as well as decrease the probability of high prices. Producers, on the 
other hand, can be assured of more stable earnings and, therefore, 
reduced farm income risk. Lower producer risks imply the macroeconomic 
effects of higher level of investments and economic growth, particularly 
in net exporting countries. For example, in evaluating the impact of the 
high world primary product price variability on the economy of New 
Zealand, Ross (1976) showed that the events of the period did retard the 
growth in the Gross National Product of the economy. Also, the income 
distribution between the farm and nonfarm sectors were affected. The 
farm sector earned lower and more variable income than the nonfarm 
sector, leading to the adoption of price insulation policies to protect 
the farm sector. Market stability will seem to be most desirable in 
developing countries for all of the above reasons and more. Given that 
developing countries are the exporters of most primary products (cocoa, 
coffee, sugar, soybeans, and most minerals), it will not be inappropriate 
to generalise the New Zealand experience to these countries. Estimates 
by Hallweod (1979, p. 8) show that, overall, the primary products of most 
developing countries have the highest price variability, and this is 
attributed to import demand instability. The estimates cover the period 
1953—1973, when prices were considered relatively more stable than latter 
years. In most of these countries, the export earnings from primary 
products are the only source of much needed foreign exchange. Further­
more, as food demand in these countries grows faster than production (as 
is the case in Sub-Sahara Africa), the share of their food import bills 
5 
in total export earnings will also be expected to grow. Variations in 
foreign exchange earnings can disrupt development programs. In fact, 
empirical analysis by Valdês and Huddleston (1977) shows that in some 
developing countries (including Tanzania, India, Bangladesh, Ghana, and 
Sri Lanka), where food production is highly variable and food imports 
constitute a large share of total imports, there is no prospect for 
continued financing of food imports through increased agricultural export 
earnings. In these cases, variable export earnings can only worsen the 
situation. 
It is also argued by Hathaway (1976) that in an economy on the 
subsistence margin, prospects of shortages and high prices induce 
speculative stockholding and encourage hoarding by both producers and 
consumers , -further increasing effects of ins tab ill try on consumers . In 
low income countries, where a majority of the people are below the 
poverty level, a stable food supply is required for improved health and 
nutrition of the population. When supplies are low and prices high, the 
poor have to cut down on their already meager consumption levels. 
Finally, in most developing countries, food shortages and consequent high 
prices are a key factor for political instability. 
In the following chapter, a review of theoretical and empirical 
analyses in the search for solutions to the problem of market instability 
is presented. The thrust of these analyses has been on the distribution 
of welfare impacts of stabilization on producers and consumers within a 
country, and between countries. Stock requirements and, therefore, costs 
of stabilization have also been investigated. Generally, the theoretical 
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conclusions are heavily dependent on the underlying assumptions. 
Similarly, the empirical results are specific to cases analyzed. This 
study will not add to Che existing vast and rather inconclusive knowledge 
in the area of welfare impacts of stabilization. Instead, the search for 
a solution to market instability is redirected toward identifying the 
factors that may compound or moderate naturally occurring instability; 
and how Chat identification may be used in distributing the costs of 
stabilization. As noted earlier, these factors are government 
intervention policies that affect the natural flow of domestic production 
and consumption and, therefore, trade. The idea of distributing costs of 
stabilization according Co regional contribution to world price 
instability has been raised by Zwart and Meilke (1979). To pursue this 
search, the following objectives are set for the study. 
Study Objectives 
(1) To determine the degree of price insulation of internal markets 
in world wheat trade. Price insulation is identified in terms of Che 
responsiveness of internal prices to world price changes. 
(2) To specify and estimate a world wheat trade and price simulation 
model, through which the price adjustment policies identified in (1) 
interact to affect wheat prices. 
(3) Measure the impacts of policies of India, the European Economic 
Community, and the Soviet Union on the stability of world and domestic 
prices and trade quantities. These impacts are measured through a 
stochastic simulation of the model in (2) above. 
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Organization of the Study 
A review of literature on the issue of market instability is 
presented in Chapter 2. In Chapter 3, a theoretical model of a world 
wheat market is presented. General specification of internal supply and 
demand relationships and how the internal markets are linked with the 
rest of the world are discussed. Description of regional markets of 
major wheat traders and estimation results of the model are presented in 
Chapter 4. 
Chapter 5 discusses the simulation results of assumed price 
insulation policy changes in India and the E.C., and the effect of 
U.S.S.R. production variability on the rest of the system. Study 
conclusions are presented in Chapter 5. 
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CHAPTER 2. A REVIEW OF STUDIES IN COMMODITY PRICE STABILIZATION 
Theory of Welfare Impacts of Stabilization 
Most of the literature on market stabilization concentrates on the 
welfare impacts of market stabilization. The first theoretical analysis 
of this aspect was developed by Waugh (1944) who showed that, given 
supply instability, consumers are better off without price stabilization. 
In 1961, Oi changed the assumption of supply instability to demand 
instability and concluded that producers preferred price instability. 
Later, in 1966, Massell integrated these two studies into a single model 
now known as the "Waugh-Oi-Massell Model." Because most of the analyses 
on market instability are based on this model, the basic features of the 
model and Massell's cone1us ions will b e presented here. The model has 
been reproduced in several reviews, notably, Turnovsky (1978) and, more 
recently, Bigman (1982). 
The Waugh—0i—Mas sell model 
The basic features of the model are: 
1. Linear supply and demand functions. 
2. Additive stochastic terms in supply and demand functions. 
3. Instantaneous response to price changes; that is, both supply 
and demand are functions of current prices. 
4. Marshallian consumer surplus measures expected gains and losses 
from price stabilization. 
5. A closed economy. 
Based on the above features, the model is specified as follows : 
S = aP + X (supply function), and (2.1) 
D = -bP + y (demand function), (2.2) 
where S = quantity supplied, 
D = quantity demanded, 
P = price, 
a,b > 0 = fixed parameters, and 
X and y = stochastic terms which are independently distributed with means 
2 2 y and y and variances a and a . 
X y X y 
The equilibrium price solution from (2.1) and (2.2) is: 
P® = and (2.3) 
.... 
P (a + b) 
is price variance without stabilization. Assuming price is completely 
stabilized at the mean, gains to consumers and producers are 
measured by Marshallian surplus as follows: 
Gp = l/2(Up - P) (S(P) + S(Up)) (producer surplus), 
= l/2(Up - P) (D(P) + D(iip)) (consumer surplus). 
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By definition, expected producer gains are: 
E(Gp) = f f  l/2( V p  - P) (S(P) + S(Vp))dydx, 
Similarly, 
( a  +  2 b ) -  a o ^  
2(a + b) 
(2a + b) - ba^ 
E(G ) = 
2(a + b) 
Net expected gains to producers and consumers are the sum of E(G^) and 
E(Gp), given by: 
~ lln * b) 
2 
If supply is the only source of instability, = 0; 
(a + 2b) 
E(G_) = X— > 0 (gains to producers); 
2(a + b) 
(a + 2&)c^ - ac^ (2a + &)o^ - So^ 
Derivation: E(G) = —= ^ + —2—-——, 
2(a + g)"^ 2(a + g) 
2 2 7 9 9 2 
aa + 2go — aa + 2aa + go - go 
= X X y y y X 
2(a + g)^ 
( a + g) + ( a + g) 
2(a + g)^ 
<j + <j 
X y 
2(a + g) • 
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2 
-bo 
ECG ) = ;t- < 0 (losses to consumers) ; and 
2(a + b) 
E(G) = 2(a + b) ^  ^  (net gains to producers and consumers 
if compensation is possible) . 
Alternatively, if Che source of instability is demand variability, then 
2 a = 0: 
X 
2 
-ao 
E(G ) = —— < 0 (losses to producers); 
^ 2(a + b)^ 
(2a + b)o^ 
E(G ) = ^ > 0 (gains to consumers) ; and 
^ 2(a + b)'^ 
2 
a 
E ( ~  2(a + b) ^  0 (net gains to all if consumers 
can compensate producers). 
The conclusions from the model regarding the distribution of welfare 
benefits of price stabilization are summarized below. 
1. If instability arises from supply variability, consumers lose 
from price stabilization while producers gain. The reverse is true if 
the source of instability is in demand shifts-
2. No matter the source of instability, gainers can always 
compensate losers such that there are net gains to both consumers and 
producers. 
3. Net gains from stabilization are directly proportional to the 
variance of demand and/or supply. 
Although the model vividly demonstrates the welfare impacts of 
stabilization in a closed economy, it has been criticized for its 
12 
simplistic assumptions. In fact, relaxations of these assumptions change 
the basic conclusions of the model. In his review of the issues in price 
stabilization, Turnovsky demonstrates the sensitivity of the results to 
model specification. 
Following arguments by Hazel1 and Scandizzo (1975), it is assumed 
that for agricultural commodities it is crop yields that are stochastic, 
so that total output computed as the product of yield and acreage incor­
porates the stochastic term in production multiplicatively. Similarly, 
incorporating risk in the derivation of consumer demand from utility 
maximization, Turnovsky (1976) and Newbery and Stiglitz (1981) show 
multiplicative stochastic term in demand as the more logical specifica­
tion of demand. A final argument is that, in practice, estimated supply 
and demand functions tend to be nonlinear. Using the more logical 
assumptions of multiplicative disturbances and nonlinear supply and 
demand functions, some of Massell's conclusions no longer hold- A major 
deviation from the earlier conclusions is that the distribution of 
welfare gains does not depend oa the source of the instability but only 
on the elasticities of supply and demand. In fact, the allocation of 
benefits between consumers and producers becomes indeterminate. 
Another modification of the Waugh-Oi-Massell model is the introduc­
tion of producer price expectation in the supply function. Conclusions 
reached under assumptions of adaptive expectations are different from 
those assuming rational expectations. Under adaptive expectations 
hypothesis, producer gains depend upon the autoregressive properties of 
the disturbances, and the length of lag in the price expectations model. 
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For consumers, stabilization from supply disturbances again results in 
welfare losses. This is because the demand side of the model with 
producer price expectations does not change from the Waugh-Oi-Massell 
model. However, stabilizing for demand variability yields indeterminate 
welfare impacts. Because supply is a function of past prices, 
stabilizing demand affects these prices; therefore, both supply and 
demand are affected. 
Yet another modification in these analyses is the introduction of 
partial equilibrium rules. The basic model assumes complete 
stabilization at the mean price. Partial price stabilization employs a 
price band rule in which a stabilization authority intervenes only when 
prices deviate from established bounds. In fact, this is the more common 
form of stabilization rule followed by governments in practice, an 
example being the U.S. grain reserve program. Turnovsky (1978) shows 
that, generally, welfare impacts are consistent with Massell's results 
only when a linear adjustment rule, by which a stabilization authority 
buys and sells stocks as prices fall below or rise above some price band, 
is assumed. Other modifications that have been proposed are general 
equilibrium models (Samuelson, 1972) and the need to recognize additional 
gains from producer response to reduced risk from price stabilization. 
An extensive analysis of the latter is provided by Newbery and Stiltz. 
They argue that measurements of welfare gains based on Marshallian 
surplus are incomplete and should be replaced by models which explicitly 
incorporate risk behavior of market agents. Linked with the issue of 
risk response is the concept of efficiency gains derived from increased 
14 
output due to producer response to reduced risk. Efficiency gains are 
distinguished from transfer benefits which result from transferring 
commodities from one period to another through storage. As an 
alternative to Marshallian surplus measures, the authors base welfare 
measures on utilities of market participants. They conclude that the 
distribution of benefits between consumers and producers is sensitive to 
the following: 
1. the degree of price stabilization, 
2. whether consumers or producers stockpile the commodity, 
3. the shape of the demand curve, and 
4. nature and source of the risk factor. 
Their results, they add, indicate the importance of the accuracy of 
functional spécification in empirical analyses of the stabilization 
problem. Obviously, their analysis does not resolve the inconclusive 
nature of results of existing research. Only empirical analyses can 
determine what the specific effects of a price stabilization scheme will 
be. 
Just and Hallam (1981) tackle the empirical verification question 
with a model capable of incorporating most of the modifications of the 
Waugh-Oi-Massell model that previous theoretical analyses justify as 
necessary. Their model is applied in the analysis of the effects of 
price stabilization in the United States wheat economy. The specific 
features considered for model flexibility are functional forms of the 
supply and demand equations, nature of disturbance terms, and the effects 
of government storage on private storage. They maintain Marshallian 
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surplus measures of welfare gains and losses as adequate, but admit that 
their assumptions of zero storage and administrative costs and complete 
stabilization are some of the major shortcomings of the model. Contrary 
to the sensitivity of theoretical results to model specification, the 
empirical results indicate that welfare impacts of stabilization on both 
domestic and foreign groups are quite stable with respect to variations 
in model parameters. They conclude, therefore, that "the great confusion 
raised by the theoretical literature appears to be largely resolvable 
from an empirical point of view" (Just and Hallam, 1981, p. 499). 
Perhaps an even more assuring conclusion from this study is that 
stabilization is indeed Pareto preferred, though quantitative gains 
depend on parameter levels of the model. 
Issues in international market stabilization 
The first application of the Waugh—Oi—Massell model in an open 
economy framework was by Heuth and Schmitz (1972). In this analysis, the 
basic model is disaggregated into a two—country framework. Marshallian 
surplus is used to measure the distribution of welfare impacts among 
consumer and producer groups within and between countries. They show 
that the distribution of welfare impacts within each country is the same 
as for the closed economy model. In addition, the exporting country 
loses from stabilization if the source of instability is in the other 
country. Finally, the two countries taken together always benefit from 
stabilization. 
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Again, the above conclusions were found to change with modifications 
in the basic assumptions. For example. Just et al, (1977)^ show that 
increased convexity of the demand curves tends to shift the distribution 
of gains in favor of consumers in both countries. Although their 
specification of disturbances in supply and demand are multiplicative, it 
is not clear what the effect of this specification is on the results. 
This analysis is also in the context of price fixing policies. 
Ronandreas and Schmitz (1978) provide an empirical test of the 
desirability of grain price stabilization in the United States. This, in 
fact, is a partial test of the Heuth and Schmitz results. Assuming 
instability in domestic supply and foreign demand, the test concludes 
that in the stabilization of feed grain prices, both consumers and 
producers gain; but, the results for wheat price stabilization are" 
inconclusive and tend to suggest that stabilization may be undesirable. 
These results, though specific due to the underlying assumptions, 
indicate that the distribution of benefits and costs of a multilateral 
storage plan may not be acceptable to all countries. For example, while 
grain exporting countries have existing storage facilities that give them 
an edge to bear most of the overhead storage costs of an international 
grain reserve, these countries may not be willing to do so because of 
^This paper is an extension of earlier analyses by Just et al. 
(1977) in which free trade was assumed, and by Bieri and Schmitz (1973) 
in which distortions were allowed but supply and demand functions were 
assumed linear. These results are comparable to the earlier free trade 
model. 
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possible skewness in benefits in favor of importing countries.^ 
Meanwhile, in the absence of an international stabilization program, 
individual countries continue to adopt unilateral stabilization schemes 
carried out through price insulation policies. 
There is now evidence (theoretical and empirical) suggesting that 
insulation of domestic market prices from the rest of the world through 
various policies affect the naturally occurring instability, or the cost 
of adjusting to instability in other markets, a point raised earlier by 
Johnson. Studies focusing on this issue are reviewed in the next 
section. 
Studies on the Impact of Government 
-Policy on MarketStability 
Intuitive arguments for the possibility of increased international 
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market instability under price insulation in domestic markets include: 
1. higher excess demand inelasticity under high supply inelasticity 
of agricultural commodities, and 
2. disincentive for domestic private stockholding, and, therefore, 
greater burden on trade adjustments. 
A formal analytical examination of this problem is provided by Bale 
and Lutz (1979) . Their model and basic conclusions are summarized here 
^Turnovsky (1978) suggests that the distribution of welfare 
impacts of stabilization of international prices could be a basis for 
determining how costs of the required storage could be allocated. 
^Increased instability is used synonymously with higher cost of 
adjustment to instability. 
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to demonstrate the impact of different policies^ on market stability. 
The model assumes a two—country world with linear demand and supply 
functions and additive stochastic terms in these functions. In the 
following algebraic and graphical demonstrations, price variability with 
fixed price policies is compared to that under free trade. 
Algebraic formulation 
Let 
DL = a^ + b^P + 6^, • i = 1, 2, and (2.5) 
+ G^, i = 1, 2, (2.6) 
where D. = demand in country i, 
= supply in country i, 
P = price, 
a., a., b,, S. = fixed parameters, and 1 X 1 1  ^ 
2 
= stochastic variables distributed as N(0, ) and 
1 
2 
N(0, a ), respectively, 
^i 
Free trade 
That the aggregate excess demand under free trade is equal to zero 
implies : 
2 2 
Z D . -  Z  S .  =  0 .  ( 2 . 7 )  
i=l ^ i=l ^ 
^Only the effects of price fixing policies are illustrated. 
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Substituting (2.5) and (2.6) in the market clearing condition (2.7), the 
common price P can be solved for. 
w 
2 2 
2 (a. - b.P + 6.) = Z (a. + g.P + £.), (2.8) 
i=l ^ ^ ^  ^ x=l ^ ^ ^  ^ 
2 (a. — a. + Ô. — e.) 
i=l 1 ^ ^ ^ 
2 ' (2.9) 
Z ( S. + b. ) 
i=l ^ 
2 2 2 
Z (oC + ) 
^ i (2.10) 
Z ( g. + b.)2 
i=l ^ 1 
2 
Op is the variance of price under free trade. 
Price fixing by importer 
Let Pj^ = exporter's price and ^2 ~ ^ 2 ~ importer's price. The 
excess demand of importer is: 
= (^2 - ^ 2^2 + ^2) - («2 + *2?: + e^) 
ED^ = *2 " *2 " (^2 ^  82)^2 + ^2 - G^. (2.11) 
Excess supply of exporter is: 
ES^ = *1 - *1 + (6^ + b^)P^ + - 5j. (2.12) 
Substituting (2.11) and (2.12) in (2.7), we solve for: 
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2 _ 
P. = Z (a. - a. + 6. - e.) - (b + g )P , and 
1 X X 6 6 wk i=l 
(2.13) 
(2.14) 
2 Comparing in (2.14) 
w 
2 2 in (2.10) shows that a > a 
w 
Therefore, by fixing its domestic price, the importing country increases 
price instability in the exporting country. Following the same 
procedure, it can be shown that the exporting country can also increase 
instability in the importing country by fixing its internal price. A 
graphical demonstration of these impacts appears in Figure 2.1 and 2.2. 
Assume an initial situation with supply, demand, and excess demand 
functions at , S^, , ES^, and ED^. Under free trade, world price 
is P^. Exporter and importer prices are P^ and Pg, respectively. 
Suppose the importer experiences a shortfall in supply such that S^* 
prevails. Without any trade restrictions, the resulting prices are P^', 
P^', and 1*2*• -- under the new supply situation the importer decides to 
maintain price at P^, then, in the absence of stocks, an additional 
quantity A^'A^ has to be imported. This results in a larger import 
demand of 01^ and an unchanged excess supply condition. The additional 
import requirement drives prices up to P^'' and P^'' in trade and in the 
exporting country, respectively. The exporter can reduce the 
destabilizing effects of the importer's policy only by changing export 
supplies through stock adjustments. 
s 
ED 
Trade Importer Exporter 
Figure 2.1. Price fixing by importer 
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In Figure 2.2, if the exporting country fixes price at P^, the 
excess supply curve becomes inelastic (in this case, perfectly 
inelastic) below a price equivalent to Pj in trade. A supply shock in 
the importing country results in a wider price range than under free 
trade ((P_'* * - P'')>(P'-P)). A study related to the above 
2 w WW 
analyses is by Zwart and Meilke (1979) who also determine empirically 
that some reduction in the distortive policies in the world wheat market 
can be as effective as a buffer stock in reducing market instability. 
Their model, some aspects of which are applied in this study, draws the 
same basic conclusions as reached by Bale and Lutz. Shei and Thompson 
(1977) simulated impacts of sudden shocks on the world wheat market under 
various assumptions of the degree of price fixing among importers, the 
specific shocks being a sudden reduction in Tdieat purchases by the Soviet 
Union and a worldwide export quota imposed by the United States. The 
study shows that greater world market price variability results as more 
countries fix their internal prices, leading the authors to propose that 
trade liberalization can serve to stabilize world prices. Grennes, 
Johnson, and Thursby (1978) have considered the problem from the 
perspective of adjustments, through stocks, by the U.S. They show that 
insulating trade policies in other countries increases the level of 
stocks released by the U.S. to stabilize U.S. prices, and that the goal 
of stabilizing prices in the uninsulated market can be achieved more 
easily if countries can coordinate their stock policies. 
p 
TTT 
P 1 
ED2 
Q 
Exporter Trade Importer 
Figure 2.2. Price fixing by exporter 
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Apart from the instability arising from the price insulating 
policies of importers, policies of developed country exporters also add 
some variability to their supplies. Josling (1980) shows that part of 
the variability in net surplus (current production less current 
consumption) and trade of some developed country exporters can be 
attributed to their internal policies. He analyzed the impact of support 
prices on production and consumption, and on changes in stocks of wheat. 
The results show that in the period of the analysis, stocks were often 
released into the world market to export domestic overproduction and were 
accumulated when production was below consumption. The study concludes 
that some countries do adjust stocks to respond to world market 
developments, but, that such adjustments are often not enough to 
stabilize world prices. The primary reason for this inconsistent 
behavior is that policies are intended to stabilize only domestic 
markets. An example of Josling*s findings can be derived from the 
European Community's variable levy policy on wheat. The E.G. as a major 
participant in the world grain market has been criticized for its policy 
on grounds of economic irrationality and the depressing effects of the 
policy on world price levels. Koester (1982) empirically examined this 
policy and its implications for developing country agriculture. He 
demonstrates that E.G. grain prices are indeed totally disconnected from 
conditions outside the region. High price levels in the E.G. relative to 
world price levels have resulted in overproduction and, therefore, 
depression of world prices. Also, public stockholding not only restricts 
private storage, but has no correlation with fluctuations in production 
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or stocks in the rest of the world. In fact, E.G. storage only partly 
compensates for fluctuations in E.G. production. Although no quantifica­
tion is made of the effects of E.G. price levels and stock operations on 
the stability of prices in the rest of the world, the implication of 
these results is that of destabilization. 
A final important issue is the impact of grain market instability 
and policies of developed countries on grain availability to developing 
country importers. World production of widely traded grains is centered 
in the developed world. Meanwhile, some developing countries are 
becoming increasingly dependent on grain imports for their food supplies. 
It is imperative that the needy countries increase their production 
levels of food, but, it is also important to consider the relative costs 
of increased food piroductidn and reliance on food imports. Costs aside, 
as long as import needs of developing countries are growing, their 
supplies ought to be stable for reasons stated earlier. So far, 
empirical evaluations show that policies of developed country exporters 
depress world prices (Josling and Koester). Lower grain prices may 
appear to be favorable to importers. However, since these prices result 
from dumping of surpluses, we will expect such surpluses and, therefore, 
the resulting world prices to be most vulnerable to internal supply 
shocks of exporters. Besides, most exporters have long—term trade 
agreements with other developed or richer countries, so that even under 
conditions of overproduction, commitments ha:re to be fulfilled before 
dumping can occur. The creation of the food security fund at the 
International Monetary Fund is a positive step toward eliminating this 
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last concern. But, there is an increased probability of drastic price 
increases in years when production shortages may be widespread. 
The Soviet Union and other central planned economies have become 
important grain importers as they continue to expand their livestock 
sectors. Given that prices in these countries are insulated from the 
rest of the world, their importance as a destabilizing factor cannot be 
ignored. In examining the impact of changing market structure on the 
instability of the world wheat market, Schwartz and Blandford (1981) 
suggest a shift in emphasis toward analyzing the behavior of the Soviet 
Bloc importers. The argument for this proposal is that the region 
continues to gain in its share of imports, and also has the highest 
production variability. 
To summarize, research on market instability can be grouped into two 
broad categories. These include: (a) analyses on welfare impacts of 
stabilization and the associated stock requirements, and (b) effects of 
government intervention policies on market stability. The first category 
indicates the importance of empirical analyses in order to determine 
specific and unambiguous conclusions regarding welfare impacts of 
stabilization, and points to large and expensive stock requirements for 
effective stabilization. On the other hand, analyses on the effects of 
government policies show that some regional internal policies do add to 
international market instability. The main focus of this study is to 
determine the extent to which countries or regions may add to or moderate 
international wheat market instability as a result of their internal 
policies. Such a determination could form a basis for distributing the 
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costs and benefits of stabilizing international markets. Alternatively, 
given the collapse of efforts at establishing a multilateral stabiliza­
tion scheme for wheat since 1979, a study revealing the role of specific 
countries or regional blocs in compounding grain market instability can 
hopefully cause a réévaluation of such policies by governments. The 
costs of stabilization are high and it will be in the interest of regions 
to consider their roles in increasing this undesirable market 
phenomenon. 
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CHAPTER 3. A THEORETICAL SPECIFICATION 
OF A WORLD WHEAT TRADE MODEL 
One basic reason underlying commodity trade between countries is 
that there are differences in autarky prices of the commodity. 
Eliminating this price difference requires equating excess demands and 
excess supplies through trade flows between countries. The same 
principle underlies the following structural model of world trade in 
wheat. Supply and demand functions are specified for each country; the 
difference between supply and demand, for a given world price, defines 
the excess supply or excess demand for the country. Given that domestic 
prices are not necessarily equal to the world price, a price equation 
links the domestic price to the international price level. The aggregate 
world market is in equilibrium when all excess demands and supplies 
clear. 
A description of the model components is presented in the following 
sections. This is preceded by a discussion of approaches for 
incorporating government policies in commodity trade models. 
Government Intervention Policies and Their 
Incorporation in Commodity Trade Models 
Reasons for the existence of government intervention policies in 
commodity markets include both political and economic welfare factors. 
The following describe the basic categories of instruments by v^ich 
governments intervene in commodity markets. 
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1. Protection devices such as tariffs or quotas are used to 
maintain high domestic prices, thereby limiting imports. An example of 
this is the E.G. variable levy policy. 
2. Oligopolistic market control through commodity trade agreements, 
and government control of the export/import industry through government 
marketing boards. Here, examples include the Wheat Boards of Canada and 
Australia, and the prevalent control of trade by governments of most 
developing countries. 
3. Finally, price support programs, restrictions on resource use, 
and subsidies on imports are designed to maintain domestic price and 
production at artificial levels. Restriction of land use in the U.S. 
and, again, fertilizer subsidies in developing countries are examples. 
In commodity trade models, the above devices have generally been 
incorporated as exogenous shifts either through the use of dummy 
variables, or through the specification of alternative levels of the 
policy instruments. Examples include analyses by Josling, Shei and 
Thompson, and Grennes et al., all of which were reviewed in Chapter 2. A 
second and less common approach is endogenizing policy through a 
government behavioral equation. Sarris and Freebairn (1983) have used 
this approach to derive national excess demand functions from domestic 
welfare objective functions which include government as a decision agent. 
This approach is theoretically appropriate for evaluating government 
behavior by comparing actual levels of policy variables to some optimally 
derived level. However, the choice between the two approaches depends 
largely on the purpose of the model. If the objective is to determine an 
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optimal government policy, or explain the underlying motivations for a 
given policy, then government has to be integrated as a decision agent 
with some specific objective function. The problem, however, is 
identifying the relevant variables in a government objective function. 
In addition, an objective function cannot be specified without making 
some value judgement. 
The objective of this study is to determine the impacts of existing 
policies on market instability. The issue is not to determine if the 
policies are optimal in terms of meeting some objective. As outlined 
earlier, government intervention in commodity markets includes use of 
both domestic and trade instruments. The focus of this study is on the 
policy of insulating domestic prices from external market conditions, 
thus prohibiting free adjustment of trade flows. A measure of the degree 
of price insulation is the elasticity of price transmission between an 
internal price and .the world price. Although both Tweeten (1977) and 
Johnson (1977) encountered this measure in their feud over the correct 
derivation of the export demand elasticity, they attached no importance 
to its actual value. The effect of price insulation represented by a 
price transmission elasticity close or equal to zero, on the magnitude of 
the export demand elasticity, was first recognized by Bredahl et al. 
(1979). They showed empirically that price transmission elasticities 
less than unity reduced export demand elasticity of U.S. exports 
(including wheat). As shown below, their conclusions can be extended to 
the aggregate export demand elasticity. The derivation begins with the 
identity: 
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n n 
E D  =  Z D ; -  Z  S . .  ( 3 . 1 )  
i=l i=l 
Excess demand is the difference between demand and supply of all 
importing regions, i = 1, n- Under a competitive free trade 
assumption, ED, D^, and are functions of the world price P^. The 
elasticity of ED with respect to is by definition, 
(3.2) 
w 
This definition is applied to the excess demand identity to derive a 
general relationship for the elasticity of excess demand as: 
m -5;. gfi - - fi - p . gfi -l_ .fi . p (33, 
3P^ ED j = ED 9P^ w ED 9P w' 
®ED ^P. ËD ~ ^P. ED' (3.4) 
1=1 1 1 1=1 1 1 
where E^ = internal demand elasticity with respect to internal price, 
i 
Eg = internal supply elasticity with respect to internal price, 
i 
and 
Ep = elasticity of the internal price with respect to the world 
i 
price. 
If all Ep = 1, 
i 
n D. n S. 
®ED ^  ^.1D ~ .^J^S.ED' (3.5) 
1=1 1 1=1 1 
32 
if Ep = 0, 
i  ^  k -  ( 3 - * )  
1=1 X 1 1=1 1 1 
For importers. Eg and are naturally less than E^ , D^. Therefore, 
i i 
e** < e*Q. Setting Ep =0 for all i gives a lower bound to e^^. It 
will be recalled from Figure 2.1 that a reduced elasticity of excess 
demand results in larger price adjustments from given supply shifts. 
Here, the lack of price tramsmission is tested through a linkage equation 
between the domestic price and an international price. Further discus­
sion of the approach is included in the model specification presented 
next. 
Components of the Structural Model 
The market model is a nonspatial partial equilibrium model of trade; 
nonspatial because it does not identify trade flows between specific 
regions, and partial equilibrium because only one commodity is involved. 
Â trade equilibrium is allowed by the clearing of excess demands and 
supplies generated within each region. This section gives a general 
specification of the internal components of regional demand and supply 
and how each region is linked to the rest of the world through its 
imports or exports. The price linkage equation defines the degree of 
price transmission of external market conditions into the internal 
system, and trade occurs whether price transmission is allowed or not. 
The relevance of this to market stability is that quantity traded adjusts 
only to internal conditions if there is no price transmission. Recalling 
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the illustration of Figure 2.1, quantities and prices of other regions 
have to adjust in order to maintain a global equilibrium. A conceptual 
model of the destabilizing effect is discussed in a later section of this 
chapter. One limitation of this approach is the assumption of no 
constraints on import demands. For example, inadequate foreign exchange 
is an important constraint on some developing country importers. Another 
limitation is the assumption of no aid or concessional exports. This may 
not be serious, because aid and concessional exports dwindled 
dramatically since the early 1970s when world stock levels of wheat were 
exhausted and excess supplies in exporting countries were no longer a 
problem. In Chapter 4, regional demand and supply systems are specified 
and estimated on the basis of the general specification of this section, 
and the special features of the %Aieat industry of each region. 
Domestic demand 
According to the theory of consumer demand, a consumer's demand for 
a good at a point in time is a result of allocating a given income to 
that commodity and others so as to maximize their utility. The 
optimization yields consumer demand as a function of price of the 
commodity, the prices of competing commodities, and the individual's 
income. A function representing the behavior is: 
®it = fsl.t' ?!,[) (3-7) 
where = consumption by individual i at time t, 
= income of individual. 
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= price of the commodity, and 
^ = price(s) of substitute consumption good(s). 
Assuming similar consumer tastes for all consumers, and independent 
utility functions, the aggregate demand in a country is derived from 
(3.7) as: 
or 
QD|./N = QD(P^, Pg^ Y^) (3.8) 
where N equals population, and is redefined as per capita income. 
Wheat may be distinguished by food and feed uses; but, because wheat 
is generally not a feed grain (particularly in developing and non^Aieat 
producing countries), this use may not be a significant portion of total 
demand. Since feed grain demand is derived from the demand for meat, the 
magnitudes of the price and income elasticities of feed wheat depend on 
the price and income elasticities of meat. Brandow (1962), assuming 
constant returns to scale in the final product production function and a 
log-log demand function, concluded that the demand for an input is 
inelastic or elastic according as the demand for the final product is 
inelastic or elastic. Meyers (1977) extended Brandow's analyses to 
include decreasing returns to scale and an income variable in the demand 
function; in addition to extending Brandow's conclusions to the case of 
decreasing returns, he showed that income elasticity of input is larger 
for an inelastic final demand and smaller for an elastic final demand. 
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These conclusions are very important as aids either in validating feed 
demand elastiticies estimated in the model, or in the choice of such 
elasticities from other sources for simulation. 
Following equation (3.8), per capita demand for feed wheat is 
expressed as follows: 
QFEDj. = QFED(P^, \) • (3.9) 
A third component of domestic demand exists if there is a storage 
program (public or private). Assuming a speculative motive for private 
storage, the amount of grain stored at any time depends on the difference 
between current and expected prices. According to the theory of stock 
demand, this price difference must be equated to the marginal cost of 
storage to déterminé thé optimal level of storage. A second assumption 
in inventory demand theory is the transactions motive, ^ich is 
determined by the level of current output. Using these two motives for 
storage, an equation for ending stocks is specified as: 
ENSTK^ = a + bQP^ + c(P*^, - P^) (3.10) 
where ENSTK = ending stocks, 
QP = current production, 
P^ = current price, 
P^^^ = expected price for the next period, and 
a,b,c, > 0 = fixed parameters. 
Further assuming that commercial stockholders base their expectations of 
future prices on future supply conditions, P*^^ is specified as: 
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= d - e • - fGj. (3.11) 
where = production forecast, 
= government stocks, and 
d,e,f > 0 = fixed parameters. 
Substituting (3.11) in the ending stocks equation and rearranging gives 
the final form of the commercial stock demand equation: 
ENSTKj. = (a + cd) + bQP^ - cfG^ - cP^ - ceQP^+^. (3.12) 
Without forecast data on QP^, it is assumed that current production is 
used in the price expectation formation, and the commercial stock demand 
can be expressed simply as a function of current price, production, and 
government stocks. 
ENSTK^ = f(P^, QPj., Gj.). 
In this study, whether a stock demand of the form specified above is 
estimated or not for a country will depend on a number of factors. 
First, most importing countries do not hold significant levels of stocks, 
therefore, the stock demand equation is not relevant for these cases. 
Second, public storage, as in the Soviet Bloc countries, is a food 
security device and the speculative motive may not exist. It is possible 
that, in these cases, some constant proportion of annual production, or a 
minimum amount of grain, is stored. Finally, when a stock equation is 
necessary, additional explanatory variables may be required, depending on 
the nature of internal government programs regarding stocks. For 
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example, in the U.S. provisions of the farmer owned reserve program are 
crucial determinants of stock levels. 
The above specification of wheat demand is based on price theory 
vrtiich may not be applicable to the Central Planned Economies of the 
Soviet Union, China, and Eastern Europe, or indeed most other developing 
countries. For these regions, demand is postulated to depend on income 
and the available supplies mainly from production. That is: 
QD = fCQPj., Y^). (3.13) 
A linear specification of this demand function is, 
QD^ = «Q + a^Y + a^QP^, > 0 and 0 < < 1. (3.14) 
Import demand as a residual of demand and supply becomes : 
QMg = QD^ - QP^ 
or, by substitution, 
QMj. = «0 + + «^2 - (c^  - 1) < 0. (3.15) 
Production is specified as a function of trend, so that deviations from 
normal trend approximate year to year variability, due to weather. So, 
variability in production can be transmitted outside the region through 
its net imports. 
The following net import demand equation was estimated for the 
U.S.S.R., based on the above specification. 
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ÎŒTMUSR = -2,496,659 - 0.101 WHPDNUSR + 0.404 INCOME 
t (-0.162) (-0.940) (0.541) 
+ 8,475,705 DUM7280; = 0.61; DW = 1,34, (3.16) 
(1.458) 
where NETMUSR = U.S.S.R. net imports, 
WHPDNUSR = U.S.S.R. production, 
INCOME = index of aggregate income, and 
DUM7280 = zero in 1966-1971 and one elsewhere. 
Neither production nor income coefficients are significant in this 
equation. The dummy variable, DUM7280 represents the period of active 
trade by the Soviet Union in the international grain market and it is the 
only variable with a significant (at ten percent) coefficient. The 
insignificance of the coefficients of income and production variables 
suggests alternative specifications of demand. Specifically, internal 
demand is estimated and net imports computed as a residual of total 
demand and total supply. The same approach is applied to China, and 
Eastern Europe as a region. Final estimation results are presented in 
Chapter 4. 
Domestic supply 
The supply response of output depends on the product price, price of 
competing products, input prices, technology, and the weather. That 
is : 
QPj. = S(QPj., P^ , Pg3 Pit' TECH, W^ ) (3.17) 
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where PI = input prices, 
TECH = technology, and 
W =.weather. 
Another factor that determines market supply is beginning stocks. It 
will be included only as an exogenous factor in the market clearing 
condition. 
QP^ = QP(P^, Ps3,t' Fit' (3.18) 
Equation (3.18) is modified to include time t, as a proxy for 
technological change; the environment variable W, is subsumed in a 
disturbance term U in accordance with the objective of measuring purely 
stochastic shifts in production through the disturbance term. These 
stochastic shifts in production are considered the natural source of 
market instability. The time subscript on prices in (3.18) may also be 
modified because, in grain production, output in period t is a result of 
decisions in the previous period, which will have been based on price 
level in that period. That is: 
Acreage(t-l) = A(P^ ^^) 
and 
QP^ = QP(Acreage(t-l)) , 
therefore, 
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QP^ = QP(P^_j). 
Also, planting decisions in a period will be based on prices producers 
expect to receive in the next period, when output is marketed. In 
countries where government price guarantees exist, the level of 
government price supports or guarantees may, in fact, represent producer 
price expectations. As will be found later, in these cases the price 
variable is not necessarily the farm price. For now, a price variable 
reflecting government support is included in (3.18b) to give a general 
specification in (3.19). 
QP^ = 9,3,c_i. PGc. Pic. t. »,) (3.19) 
where PG equals the government price support level.The lagged price in 
(3.19) may also be interpreted as an expected price, where producer price 
expectations are based on last period's prices. 
Equations (3.8), (3.9), (3.12), and (3.19) constitute the structure 
of internal grain markets in each country. Without trade, total demand 
and supply within a country must equate to determine the domestic price 
level. With trade, this internal equilibrium condition need not hold, 
and excess supplies and demands are equated in a world market equilibrium 
setting to determine a world price. Existence of trade implies a price 
linkage equation. Domestic price, P^, differs from the world price, P^, 
only by handling and transportation costs if free trade prevails. 
However, when trade is restricted, or domestic prices are insulated from 
external supply and demand conditions, the nature of the price linkage 
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equation is determined largely by Che policy prevailing in the particular 
region. The extreme to a free market situation is a completely insulated 
domestic market, in which case a price linkage equation is not necessary. 
A conceptual model of the nature of the effects of price linkages between 
internal and external markets is presented next. 
Price insulation policies and their impact on world price stability: 
A conceptual model 
The regional supply and demand functions and a market clearing 
condition are represented by the following set of linear equations. 
EK = a_ - b^P^, i = 1, ..., n; (3.20) 
_ Su = c^ + d^P^ + U^, i = 1, . .., n; (3.21) 
P. = a. + g.P .; (3.22a) 
1 1 1 wi' 
n n 
Z  D .  =  E S .  ( 3 . 2 3 )  
i=l i=l 
and are demand and supply, respectively, and P^ is price in the 
domestic market; a., b., c., and d. are fixed parameters. P . is the 
1 1 1 X wi 
world price expressed in the units of the i*"^ country currency. is 
stochastic shift in domestic supply and is assumed to be the natural 
source of market instability. Equation (3.22a) represents a general 
intervention rule in which levels of and reflect the type of policy 
prevailing in the region. For example, in a free market, all = 0 and 
all B. = 1. When some a. > 0 and 3- = 1, then a fixed tariff policy is 1 1 1 
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implied for the region. The appeal for use of such a general 
intervention rule is that the levels, or even type of policy instruments 
that a government uses, are likely to change with domestic economic 
conditions. A general rule, as in (3.22a), therefore allows the 
parameters a and 8 to capture the net effect of varying policy 
instruments, which do not necessarily represent changes in policy. 
The following expressions for price levels and variabilities are 
derived from (3.20) and (3.23). 
n n n 
2 (a. — c.) - Z a.(b. — d.) - 2 u. 
P . = (3.24) 
wi n 
E B.(b. + d.) 
i=l ^ ^ ^ 
: ^ 
^ [ Z 8^(b^ + d^)]^ 
i=l 
Z(a. — c.) — Za.(b. - d.) — Zu. 
?! = '1 * «it— V(b.'^d.) ' 
11 1 
al = 6; Op . (3.27) 
i wi 
The effect of levels of parameters of the intervention model on price 
stability are clear from (3.25) and (3.27). Suppose 8^ = 1 and = 0; 
then Var(P^) = VAR(P^^). This result, though trivial, has important 
implications for the effects of price insulation in one region on the 
stabilization costs within regions that maintain more flexible pricing 
policies. 
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Zwaxt and Meilke included a storage policy in their model to analyze 
the relative effectiveness of policy changes, and a storage program on 
reducing price instability. In this study, only storage programs of 
major exporters or importers are included, largely because the 
possibility of an international storage program seems rather remote. 
Specification of such independent stock equations can better demonstrate 
the burden imposed on individual regions for stock adjustments to 
moderate price instability either internally or externally. Also, for 
their estimation, Zwart and Meilke (1979) derive what they call "policy 
inclusive" demand and supply functions, by substituting the intervention 
equation for in the domestic supply and demand functions so that these 
become functions of the world price as shown below. 
By substituting (3.22a) in (3.20) and (3.21), the policy inclusive 
response functions are: 
Although their approach reduces the number of equations to estimate, the 
specification does not allow direct estimation of the policy parameters, 
which is necessary to identify regions with or without market insulation 
policies. In this model, therefore, the intervention equations are 
estimated individually and tests of hypotheses about the levels of the 
parameters identify regional wheat price insulation policies. To 
simulate what might have been without price insulation in a particular 
region, equation (3.22) is altered such that the internal price is 
(3.28a) 
S. = (c. + a,) + g.d.P . + u 
L X 1 1 1 wi 
(3.28b) 
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equivalent to the world price at all times. For an importer, the 
internal price without price insulation is assumed to be the unit value 
of imports (UV^). The unit value is substituted in the system of 
equations for the internal price, . Equation (3.22a) becomes: 
UV. = a! + g;p + T. (3.22b) 
1 1 1 w 
In addition, is restricted to one to simulate full price transmission. 
Since UV includes transportation and handling costs, the right-hand side 
of (3.22b) is adjusted by an approximate shipping cost (T). Cases 
considered in the simulation of alternative policies are the European 
Community, India, and the U.S.S.R. The E.G. maintains wheat prices that 
are above world price levels. India is included because of her growing 
supply condition and the possibility of changing from a net importer of 
wheat to a large net exporter. India also has a significant government 
participation in the wheat industry, although it is not clear whether the 
rest of the market is responsive to external conditions. The Soviet 
Union is undoubtedly a large importer and, because of the planned nature 
of the Soviet economy, imports are determined totally by internal 
conditions. A high variability of Soviet production further increases 
the country's capacity to destabilize markets of the rest of the world. 
Events of the early to mid-1970s discussed in Chapter 1 are a perfect 
example. 
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The world aggregate model 
The aggregate structural model for the world wheat market, including 
K countries, is summarized in the following set of equations. Subscript 
i denotes a country. 
QFOD . = QFOD.CP ^ P ., Y ., U .) (food demand), (3.29) 
tjl 1 C ) 1 s J. C g 1 C ) 1. 1 iZ ^  1. 
QFED^ . = QFED(P^ P U.^ .) (feed demand), (3.30) 
G ) 1 C ) 1 s 6 & ^ 1 U ^  1 6 L g ]» 
ESTOCK . = ESTOCK.(QP P^ ., BSTOCK ., U_ .) 
t,1 1 ^ t,L' t,i' t,i' 3t,i 
(stock demand), (3.31) 
QPt,i = QPi(Pt-l,i' ^ s3t-l,i' ^ ^t,i' ^4t,i) 
(production), (3.32) 
P . = P.(PW .) (linkage between domestic 
t,j. 1 t,i 
and world prices). (3.33) 
Identities : 
ED . = QFOD . + QFED . + (ESTOCK . - BSTOCK .) - QP .. (3.34) t j l  L  )  1  U y X  c ; 1  C ^  I  ( 2 ) 1  
I f  E D  .  > 0 ,  c o u n t r y  i  i s  a  n e t  i m p o r t e r ;  i f  E D  .  < 0 ,  c o u n t r y  i  i s  a  t, 1 t, 1 
net exporter. 
n 
Z ED . = 0 (world market equilibrium condition). (3.35) 
i=l 
Variables are redefined as follows: 
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Endogenous variables 
QFOD = domestic use of wheat for food; 
QFED = domestic use of wheat for feed; 
ESTK = ending stocks; 
QP = domestic production; 
PW = world price; 
P = domestic price, exogenous for some regions; 
and 
^1 ' ^2' ^ 3' ^4 " disturbance terms in the respective 
equations. 
Exogenous variables 
PS = price of a substitute grain, 
Y = per capita income, 
BSTOCK = beginning stocks, 
PG = government support price, and 
t = trend variable. 
Descriptions and Sources of Data 
The regional classification (Appendix A) used is based on the 
grains, oilseeds, and livestock model of the United States Department of 
Agriculture (U.S.D.A.). The classification is largely geographic, but is 
also based on economic factors. The data used for the analyses include 
wheat use and supply quantity data obtained from the Foreign Agricultural 
Service of the U.S.D.A. ; annual data on incomes, exchange rates, and 
consumer price indexes were obtained from the International Financial 
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Statistics of the International Monetary Fund, Most wheat price data was 
derived from the Food and Agricultural Organization (F.A.O.) price 
statistics. Additional price information on the U.S., Canada, Australia, 
and the E.E.C. was obtained from the U.S.D.A. Agricultural Statistics 
(various issues), Canada Grain Trade Statistics (various issues), 
Yearbook of the Commonwealth of Australia (various issues) , and Herlihy 
et al. (1983) . 
Given the large number of regions and lack, of adequate information 
for most, the cost of estimation vis-a-vis the quality of the estimates 
is a very important consideration in the analysis. Extensive estimation 
of the structural components described in the above section is limited to 
only some regions, the choice of the region being determined by quality 
of—pr el iminar y est imates and the - impor tance o f -the -region—in - world wheat 
trade. 
48 
CHAPTER 4. SPECIFICATION AND ESTIMATION OF REGIONAL 
STRUCTURAL EQUATIONS OF THE WHEAT TRADE MODEL 
This chapter presents descriptions of the internal wheat markets of 
the U.S., Canada, Australia, India, Japan, and the E.C., and estimates of 
equations representing these market systems. The first part of the 
chapter defines price variables used in the model. Preliminary estimates 
of price linkage equations are also presented. The second section is a 
description of the above market systems and the Ordinary Least Squares 
(OLS) estimates of the individual equations, which later form the system 
equations of the model. Estimated demand systems of other regions are 
also discussed, although specification of the equations are based 
entirely on the theoretical demand model of Chapter 3. The final section ^ - - — - -
of the chapter summarizes results of the wheat trade model estimated as a 
nonlinear system, using the two—stage least squares method. 
Price Linkages 
One of the components of regional structural equations presented in 
Chapter 3 is the price equation through which changes in the external 
market may be transmitted internally to stimulate adjustments. Whether 
domestic prices are responsive to the world price is determined by the 
dominant policy of the particular country or region. In this study, the 
response is tested through the null hypothesis, EL = 0, on the following 
equation: 
- "i ^  
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is the parity price of wheat in region i and P^ is the world price 
faced by the region. For single country regions, the world price is the 
import price (cif) or the export price (fob). The world price is 
generally assumed to be the Rotterdam price (cif). The Rotterdam port i 
said to be the most efficient import market (Hausamann, 1970). In other 
cases, the influence of regional trade patterns determines which 
international price is linked with the domestic price. For example, 
wheat price levels in the United States affect prices in Canada so the 
international price in the linkage equation for Canada is the U.S. gulf 
port price. The test applied to the price equation is similar to that 
used in similar evaluations, such as by Josling (1980). The difference 
here is in the definition of prices. Josling estimated regressions of 
nominal prices of single countries on import values. In this study, 
prices are in real dollar values, and converted to parity levels. The 
following sections define variables of the price equation. 
(a) Single country i, i= 1, ..., n. 
PAR. = (P./CPI.) * RE. 
I l l  1  
where = nominal price (local currency), 
CPI^ = consumer price index, 
RE. = CPI./(CPI * R.) is real exchange rate (the subscript "us" 
1 1 us 1 
denotes the United States) , 
R^ = nominal exchange rate (local currency/dollar), and 
PAR^ = parity price in real dollars. 
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The nominal exchange rate is, therefore, adjusted by the relative rates 
of inflation between the country and the United States to obtain a real 
exchange rate. The real exchange rate is used since real prices are 
being linked across countries. The real exchange rate (RE) would be 
constant over time if purchasing power parity held across countries. The 
concept of purchasing power parity is that exchange rates adjust to 
exactly compensate for changes in relative rates of inflation. In 
general, however, RE is not a constant, since other factors including 
government actions influence exchange rates. The common currency used is 
the United States dollar. 
(b) Region i with k countries. 
Each price in the k-country region is first converted to its 1975 
dollar equivalent; 1975 is chosen because it is the base year for the 
consumer price index variable. 
RPj(1975) = Pj/(CPIj * Rj(1975)), (j = 1, ..., k) 
where RPj(1975) = real price of country j in 1975 U.S. dollars. A 
weighted average of regional prices is obtained using annual consumption 
shares as weights (wO . 
WKP. = E w.(-
P. 
J 
i jt^'j'CPIj * Rj(1975)' 
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Similarly, a weighted average of real exchange rates, WRE-^ is computed 
as : 
k 
WRE. = Z w.((CPI./GPI ) * (RE.(1975)/R.)), and 
^ j_2 J J  us J  J  
PAR. = WRP. * WRE.. 
1 1 i 
The above definitions give two types of prices. The first is the real 
price expressed in either local currency (for single country regions) or 
in 1975 dollars (for k-country regions). This is the price used in 
estimating internal demand and supply equations; it is the price 
producers and consumers within the region respond to. The second is the 
parity price, which is the internal real price adjusted to the external 
price equivalent through the real exchange rate index. The index 
converts all prices into one standard currency with a common deflator. 
In general, RE should remain fairly stable if the nominal exchange rate 
adjusts with the relative rates of inflation. However, the data shows 
that some countries maintain relatively fixed nominal exchange rates. 
The possible distortions on the parameters of the price equation, due to 
nonvarying exchange rates, cannot be overlooked. RE should remain fairly 
stable over time as exchange rates adjust with inflation; this implies 
that the internal real price and the parity price trend in the same 
direction. If the nominal rate remains fairly constant, while the price 
index in country i relative to the U.S. price index rises, then RE shows 
a positive trend while the real internal price declines. Therefore, 
changes in the parity price relative to the internal price can be 
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distorted if the trend in the real exchange rate index is strong enough, 
and the estimated linkage of the parity price to the world price will not 
reflect the true response of the internal price to external market 
conditions. Nevertheless, the linkage equation represents an indirect 
price policy generated by a policy of not adjusting nominal exchange 
rates with inflation. The relevant variables of the price linkage 
equation for selected regions are presented in the figures contained in 
Appendix B. The plots of RE and R over time show that, during the 1970s, 
most countries did not adjust nominal exchange rates enough to compensate 
for inflation. This is in contrast to the conclusion by De Vries (1968) 
that the lack of adjustment was peculiar only to developing countries. 
Returning to equation 4.1, two possible cases regarding the linkages 
between internal and.world prices are necessarily implied by the null 
hypothesis and its alternative. 
Case 1. = 0. 
In this case, the internal price is insulated from the world market 
conditions. includes both transportation costs and policy determined 
levels of the internal price. 
Case 2. ^ 0. 
This situation implies an internal price which is responsive to 
world market conditions. The level of may represent only normal costs 
of trade, or may include a policy adjustment of the internal price to a 
level either above (e.g., Japan) or below (e.g., Egypt) the world price. 
Regions for which 3^ is not 0 will have different degrees of response 
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determined by the elasticity of price transmission, which is evaluated 
as : 
EPi = * (Pw/Pi); 
at the mean, 
Ep = g. * (T /P.). 
1 w 1 
P and P. are mean values. The value of Ep. is also determined by a.. A 
w 1 1 •' 1 
large , given , reduces the elasticity of transmission. This is also 
supported by the fact that a large value of implies high levels of 
protection of internal prices. High levels of protection are usually 
determined by factors other than the market. Table 4.1 summarizes the 
estimated price linkage equations and the implied elasticities of price 
transmission. Prices in Canada and Australia are most responsive to the 
U.S. price, with price transmission elasticities ranging from 0.22 in 
Japan to 0.73 in Rotterdam. While there is no difference in price levels 
of Canada and the U.S., large intercept terms of other regions indicate 
effects of shipping costs and policy on price. The specific cases of 
Japan and the E.C. in Table 4.1 are examples of policies that maintain 
high domestic support prices that vary with external prices, but do not 
permit full transmission of external price changes into the internal 
market. 
Table 4.1. Price linkage equations 
Explanatory variables 
(international price) 
Dependent variable 
(regional price) Intercept 
Rotterdam 
(cif) 
U.S. gulf 
port (fob) 
U.S. gulf 
port (lag) 
ep (at 
mean) 
Rotterdam 
(cif) 
Other West Europe 
Region farm price 
18.507 
( 1 . 1 1 1 )  
Canada -26.779 
(fob, Pacific ports) (-0.639) 
Canada -31.507 
(realized board price) (-1.742) 
Australia -18.139 
(export price, fob) (-2.663)* 
Japan 252.567 
(resale price) (2.039)* 
E.G. 167.308 
(threshold price) (9.840)** 
89.296 
(8.916)** 
0.701 
(5.321)** 
0.079 
(0.987) 
0 . 1 2 0  
(0 .808)  
1.360 
(16.158)** 
1.89 
(8.592)** 
0.875 
(17.846)** 
1.263 
(0.990) 
0.751 
(5.113)** 
0.84 
0.85 
0.96 
0 .28  
0.73 
0.95 1.22 
1 . 2 6  
1 . 1 8  
0.35 
0.70 0.34 
0 .08  0 .10  
Ul 
•F~ 
Portugal farm price 148.791 
(9.243)** 
0.152 
(1.190) 
0 . 1 2  0 . 2 0  
*Significant at five percent. 
**Significant at one percent. 
Table 4.1. continued 
Explanatory variables 
(international price) 
Dependent variable 
(regional price) Intercept 
Rotterdam 
(cif) 
U.S. gulf 
port (fob) 
U.S. gulf 
port (lag) R2 
Bp (at 
mean) 
Austria 123.282 
(13.442)** 
0.185 
(2.542)* 
- - 0.30 0.16 
Spain 127.542 
(10.423)** 
0.165 
(1.698) 
- - 0.19 0.14 
India farm price 133.7 
(4.524)** 
0.172 
(0.734) 
- - 0.05 0.14 
Pakistan 168.45 
(5.329)** 
-0.441 
(-1.758) 
- - 0.24 0.00 
Brazil, farm 91.24 
(3.351)** 
0.677 
(3.134)** j 
- 0.50 0.48 
Venezuela 110.393 
(4.261)** 
0.461 
(2.240)* 
- - 0.33 0.34 
Other South America 
Region farm price 76.850 
(6.999)** 
0.322 
(3.763)** 
- 0.56 0.34 
Peru 115.093 
(4.386)** 
0.476 
(2.322)* 
- 0.33 0.33 
Table 4.1. continued 
Explanatory variables 
(international price) 
Dependent variable 
(regional price) Intercept 
Rotterdam 
(cif) 
U.S. gulf 
port (fob) 
U.S. guli: 
port (la%) 
, ep (at 
R mean) 
Colombia 
Bolivia 
Middle America 
Region farm price 
Mexico farm price 
North Africa and Middle 
East (high income) 
Region farm price 
Algeria farm price 
Iran farm price 
127.176 
(6.192)** 
33.734 
(2.207)** 
75.088 
(6.103)** 
70.067 
(6.067)** 
114.680 
(9.275)** 
141.448 
( ) 
113.925 
(6.925)** 
0.340 
(2.124)* 
0.954 
(7.995)** 
0.189 
(1.982)* 
0.248 
(2.769)* 
0.171 
(1.790) 
0.106 
(0.593) 
0.200 
(1.390) 
0.20 0.25 
0.85 0.72 
0.25 0.23 
0.34 0.30 
0.29 0.15 
0.04 0.08 
0.20 0.18 
Table 4.1. continued 
Explanatory variables 
(international price) 
Dependent variable 
(regional price) Intercept 
Rotterdam 
(cif) 
U.S. gulf 
port (fob) 
U.S. gulf 
port (lag) R^ 
ep (at 
mean) 
North Africa and Middle 
East (low income) 
Region farm price 74.847 
(6.690)** 
0.404 
(4.547)** 
- - 0.67 0.40 
Egypt farm price 89.13 
(6.619)** 
0.234 
(2.193)* 
- - 0.32 0.25 
Morocco farm price 59.929 
(1.98)* 
0.833 
(3.466)** 
-
- 0.55 0.58 
Turkey farm price 74.475 
(2.961)* 
0.554 
(2.774)* 
- - 0.43 0.47 
East Africa 
Region farm price 36.655 
(4.527)** 
0.030 
(0.444) 
- - 0.02 0.09 
Kenya farm price 78.310 
(4.483)** 
0.320 
(2.393)* 
- - 0.34 0.32 
Central Africa 
Region 69.685 
(2.341)* 
0.452 
(1.905) 
— 
- 0.29 0.45 
ui 
•-J 
Table 4.1. continued 
Explanatory variables 
(international price) 
Dependent variable Rotterdam U.S. gulf U.S. gulf ep (at 
(regional price) Intercept (cif) port (fob) port (lag) R mean) 
Ethiopia 124.690 0.024 0.01 0.02 
(11.595)** (0.282) 
Nigeria 167.321 0.565 0.21 0.21 
(3.640)** (1.543) 
Zaire 2.714 0.493 0.32 0.98 
(0.090) (2.056)* 
Thailand 21.239 0.403 0.63 0.71 
(1.722) (4.115)** 
Indonesia 34.120 0.439 0.23 0.62 
(1.054) (1.709) 
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Internal Demand and Supply Equations 
As described in Chapter 3 ,  at least two structural equations 
represent regional supply and demand behavior; these include production 
and total use. The residual supply or demand is net trade. Â world 
equilibrium is obtained by equating all excess demands and excess 
supplies. 
Production equations are estimated only for major producers of 
wheat. Over 90 percent of the world's total wheat production originates 
in only 11 regions, shown in Table 4.2. 
Except in cases where wheat used for feed is a significant share of 
total domestic use, demand equations are specified either as total demand 
(feed plus food) or just food or feed demand. The choice of the 
dependent variable for the demand equation is based on the nature and 
statistical significance of preliminary estimates and the variability of 
the variable over the historical period. The decision on estimating 
stock demand equations is based on similar considerations. In general, 
production is specified as a product of yield and area planted. This 
approach follows from crop supply analyses, such as econometric analyses 
of the grain markets of the United States by Gallagher et al. (1981), and 
of Canada and Australia by Spriggs (1978, 1981). The reasoning is that 
the variability in area planted is largely determined by economic 
factors, while yield variability is more subject to environmental factors 
as well as technology. Separation of economic factors from more natural 
factors on production is of particular importance in this study since 
variability in production due to environmental factors is assumed to be 
Table 4.2. Annual wheat production (1,000 MT) in 11 regions (1970-1980) 
Region 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 
U.S.A. 36,783 44,052 42,081 46,560 48,496 57,888 58,487 55,684 48,336 58,080 64,618 
Canada 9,024 14,412 14,514 16,159 13,295 17,078 23,587 19,862 21,145 17,185 19,158 
Australia 8,216 8,995 6,966 12,235 11,560 12,409 12,021 9,727 18,417 16,513 11,238 
Argentina 4,056 4,356 4,301 4,221 4,498 5,380 4,242 4,349 4,093 4,000 7,780 
EC-9 34,746 40,134 41,454 41,393 45,391 38,105 39,114 38,489 47,601 46,439 52,141 
Other West 
Europe 9,052 11,006 9,806 9,372 11,305 10,397 11,553 9,280 10,909 9,283 12,453 
U.S.S.R. 99,734 98,760 85,993 109,784 83,193 66,224 96,882 92,161 120,820 90,200 98,182 
East Europe 23,040 30,263 30,661 31,631 34,230 28,710 35,014 34,583 35,911 27,625 34,469 
India 20,093 23,832 26,410 24,735 21,778 24,104 28,846 29,010 31,749 35,508 31,830 
Low income 
North Africa 
and Mid East 12,723 16,513 16,417 13,165 15,173 18,053 20,226 18,784 19,780 18,982 19,723 
China 31,000 31,000 35,900 35,000 38,000 1 41,000 50,500 41,000 54,000 62,730 54,155 
Total 288,467 323,323 314,503 344,255 327,639 319,348 380,472 352,929 412,761 386,545 405,747 
World 315,586 349,412 343,476 372,807 357,359 351,066 I ' 421,581 384,502 446,620 422,451 439,206 
Percent of 
world 91 93 92 92 92 1 90 92 92 92 92 
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the natural cause of market instability. Yield is specified as a 
stochastic trend equation and multiplied by a deterministic area 
equation. The residual of the yield equation estimates the unsystematic 
deviation of production from normal trend. Description of regional 
structural equations follows. 
United States wheat model 
The explanatory variables of the U.S. area equation include the 
U.S. farm price of wheat and sorghum, and the effective support rate and 
diversion payment for winter wheat. A diversion payment is a payment to 
producers to take land out of production, while the effective support 
rate is the minimum guaranteed payment. All prices are specified in real 
terms as specified in the previous section. Prices in the U.S. area 
equation are also lagged one period. 
Wheat demand is separated into food and feed uses, each estimated on 
a per capita basis. Food demand is specified as a function of the farm 
price, real per capita income, and the real farm price of barley. The 
feed demand equation includes wheat price, price of sorghum, and the 
number of cattle on feed as explanatory variables. In his description of 
wheat feeding in the U.S., Gomme (1972) reports that wheat feeding 
depends largely on the relative prices of wheat and feed grains, 
particularly sorghum. This is because wheat prices are at their seasonal 
lows when feed grain prices are at their seasonal highs. He, therefore, 
used the price differential between wheat and sorghum as the price 
variable in a feed demand equation. Gallagher et al. used the ratio of 
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wheat price to sorghum price to reflect this price effect. The number of 
cattle on feed is included as an indication of the level of feeding 
activity in the livestock industry. Since this variable is an input in 
the livestock sector, per capita income is also included in the feed 
equation to reflect the effect of the demand for livestock products on 
the demand for feed. 
The final component of wheat demand in the U.S. is the demand for 
stocks. The stock equation specified here is based on the stock demand 
model derived in Chapter 3. Equations of the U.S. wheat model are 
represented by the following general functional forms. 
Yield: WHYDUS = F^(T, Ul), 
Area: WHACUS = Fg(WHRFPUS_]^, SORFPUS_^, WHRDWUS, WHRSPUS, 
WHACUS_Y, U2) , 
Food : WHFODUS = FgCWHRFPUS, BARFPUS, RLINCUS, U3), 
Feed : l^EDUS = F^(WHRFPUS, SORFPUS, CATFEDUS, DUM73, U4) , 
Stocks : WHESTUS = FgCWHRFPUS, WHPDNUS, WHCCCST, WHFORUS , U5), 
Net exports : NETXUS = : NETMROW + NETMIND + IsfETMJP + NETMMAM + NETMCAF 
+ NETMCHM + NETMOSAM + NETMOSAS + NETMENE 
+ NETMUSR + NETMOWE - NETXAUS - NETXCA 
- NETXAR - NETXEC, 
Gulf port price: RGULFUS = F^CWHRFPUS, U6), and 
Production: WHPDNUS = WHYDUS * WHACUS. 
Endogenous variables 
WHYDUS = U.S. yield, metric tons per hectare (MT/ha); 
WHACUS = U.S. area harvested, hectares (ha); 
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WHFODUS = U.S. food use, kilograms (kg); 
WHFEDUS = U.S. feed use, (kg); 
WHESTUS = U.S. ending stocks (MT); 
WHPDNUS = U.S. production (MT); 
WHRFPUS = U.S. farm price (U.S. $/MT); 
RGULFUS = U.S. gulf port price, fob (U.S. S/MT); 
NETXUS = U.S. net exports (MT) ; 
NETXCA = Canada, net exports (MT) ; 
NETXAUS = Australia, net exports (MT) ; 
NETXEC = E.E.C. net exports (MT); 
NETMIN = India, net imports (MT) ; 
NETMJP = Japan, net imports (MT) ; 
l^TMMAM = Middle America, net imports (MT) ; 
NETMCAF = Central Africa, net imports (MT); 
NETMCHM = China, net imports (MT); 
NETMOSAM = Other South America, net imports (MT); 
NETMENE = Eastern Europe, net imports (MT); 
NETMUSR = U.S.S.R., net imports (MT); and 
NETMOWE = Other West Europe, net imports (MT). 
Exogenous variables 
T = trend; 
SORFFUS = U.S. sorghum farm price (U.S. $/MT); 
WHRDWUS = U.S. winter wheat diversion payment 
(U.S. $/MT); 
WHRSPUS = U.S. effect support rate (U.S. $/MT) 
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BARFPUS = U.S. barley farm price (U.S. $/MT); 
RLINCUS = U.S. per capita income (U.S. $); 
CATFEDUS = number of cattle on feed (1,000 head); 
DUM73 = 1 in 1973, 0 elsewhere; 
WHFORUS = farmer-owned reserves (MT); 
WHCCCST = Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC) owned 
stocks (MT); 
NETMROW = net imports, rest of world; 
NETXAR = net exports, Argentina; and 
Ul, U2, US, U4, U5, and U6 = disturbance terms. 
Canada wheat model 
The wheat industry of Canada- is complicated^by-controls of the 
federal government, and makes the choice of economic variables to model 
the industry rather difficult. The following description of the 
industry, particularly the marketing arrangements, is intended to 
highlight the special features of the Canadian wheat sector. The 
description is derived largely from Spriggs (1981). 
The marketing system is crucial to choosing the appropriate price 
variable of the area response function because it determines the returns 
to producers, and their expectations of prices. Growers sell their grain 
either to the Canadian Wheat Board (CWB), or the off-board market (i.e., 
selling to mills within state boundaries). If sold to the CWB, producers 
receive an initial payment, which is later adjusted by a final payment, 
to yield a realized price. All producers selling to the Board receive 
the same price for the season, regardless of lAien the grain is delivered. 
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Payments are based on the return from domestic and export sales. The CWB 
also operates a delivery quota system to spread deliveries evenly from 
harvest to harvest, and to help prevent overloading the distribution 
system. 
The off-board market is free and competitive, and producers receive 
full payment for their grain on delivery. Wheat for food and industrial 
use is àold by the CWB to mills at the "mill price." Until 1979, the 
mill price was set independently of the market; since then, the price has 
been set equal to the export price and within given limits of the latter. 
Wheat for feed use is sold primarily through the off-board market. The 
CWB supplies wheat to the off-board market only when prices in this 
market rise above U.S. feed prices. Thus, the price of feed grains in 
the U.S. indicatea ceiling for Canadian feed wheat prices. 
Due to this segmentation of the Canadian wheat market, no single 
price can clearly represent what producers respond to in an aggregate 
area equation. As a result, various prices hav& been used in past 
analyses to represent the supply response price variable. For example, 
Capel (1968) used the CWB international wheat agreement price, while 
Meilke (1976) incorporated the initial and final payments by the CWB as 
separate explanatory variables. In the latest analysis, Spriggs (1981) 
used the off—board price, based on the model developed by Jolly and Abel 
(1978), which shows that for a producer with a profit maximizing objec­
tive, the supply response price is the expected off-board price, whether 
quotas are binding or not. From the first order conditions of the profit 
maximizing function, Spriggs shows that the supply response inducing 
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price is the dual variable associated with the production function 
constraint, and is interpreted as the minimum price the producer expects 
in order to increase output by one unit (Spriggs, 1981, p. 61). The 
derivation is reproduced in Appendix C. 
If quotas are nonbinding (i.e., deliveries are strictly less than 
delivery entitlements offered by the CWB) , then the expected board price, 
^c wb ' 1:he supply inducing price (PS); but, if quotas are binding and 
producers have to deliver their entitlements, then PS is less than the 
^cwb amount equal to the shadow price of delivery entitlements. 
Spriggs chose the expected off-board price as an alternative to using 
^cwb' 3^justed by a proxy for the shadow price of delivery entitlements. 
The price chosen for this analysis is the realized board price, lagged 
one year. This implies a rather strbng assumption of hbnbindihg quotas. 
Other variables of the Canadian wheat area equation are the real farm 
price of barley and a dummy variable for 1970 to reflect the Lower 
Inventories for Tomorrow program of that year. A lagged area variable is 
also included for a short-run adjustment effect. 
Stocks are held both privately on farms and by the CWB, but, since 
the stocks data is not disaggregated, the distinction between government 
and private stock demand is not made. Following the stock demand model 
specified earlier, the Canadian stock equation is a function of off-board 
price, current production, and beginning stocks. 
The Canadian export price is linked with the U.S. gulf port price. 
Since board payments are based in part on export sales, the realized 
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board price is linked with the export price. The following specification 
represents the Canadian wheat market. 
Yield: WHYDCA = F^(T, U7), 
Area: WHACCA = Fg(WHRRPCA_^, BARFPCA_^, LIFT, WHACCA_^, U8), 
Food: WHFODCA = F^CWHSMP, INCRLCA, BARFPCA, U9), 
Feed: WHFEDCA = F^^CWHRFPCA, BARFPCA, CATRPCA, UIO), 
Stocks: WHESTCA = F^^CWHRFPCA, WHPDNCA, WHESTCA_^, Ull), 
Realized price: WHRRPCA = F^^CWHREXPCA, U12), 
Export price: WHREXPCA = F^^CRGULFUS, Ui3), 
Net exports: NETXCA = WHPDNCA + WHESTCA_^ - WHESTCA - ((WHFODCA 
+ WHFEDCA) * POPCAN), and 
Production: WHPDNCA = WHYDCA * WHACCA. 
Endogenous variables 
WHYDCA = Canada, yield (MT/ha); 
WHACCA = Canada, area harvested (ha); 
WHFODCA = Canada, food use (kg); 
WHFEDCA = Canada, feed use (kg); 
WHPDNCA = Canada, production (MT); 
WHESTCA = Canada, ending stocks (MT); 
WHREXPCA = Canada, export price, fob Pacific ports (Can $/MT); 
WHRRPCA = Canada, realized board price (Can $/MT); 
WHRFPCA = Canada, off—board price (Can $/MT); and 
NETXCA = Canada, net exports. 
Exogenous variables 
BARFPCA = Canada, barley farm price (Can $/MT); 
LIFT = dummy variable, equal to 1 in 1970, and 0 elsewhere; 
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WHRMP = Canada, mill price (Can $/MT); 
INCRLCA = Canada, per capita income (Can $); 
. POPCAN = Canada, population; and 
CATRPCA = Canada, cattle price (Can $/100 lb. live weight). 
Australia wheat model 
The wheat industry of Australia is controlled almost entirely by the 
Australian Wheat Board (AWB). However, unlike Canada, the AWB is 
responsible for the handling of all wheat. Growers receive a series of 
payments (usually two) for wheat delivered to the Board. The total 
payment is based on total returns from domestic and export sales of a 
particular pool of grain, and the provisions of the wheat stabilization 
program prevailing at the time, 
Australia had a series of six five-year stabilization programs over 
the period 1948—1980. Details of these programs were obtained from 
various issues of the Yearbook of the Commonwealth of Australia. The 
first five plans (1948-1973/74) were basically similar and involved 
guaranteed payments and quantities and an export tax. Under these five 
plans, all wheat delivered was pooled and resold either to domestic mills 
at the home consumption price, or exported at world prices. The gross 
return to the grower was then determined as an average of returns from 
domestic and export sales. However, the provisions of a stabilization 
fund required either a mark up or mark down of the average return. The 
stabilization program allowed a guaranteed quantity and price. If the 
average returns from export sales exceeded the guaranteed price, then an 
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export tax was paid into the fund; otherwise, payments were made out of 
the fund to raise the export return to the level of the guaranteed price, 
which was based on the cost of production. 
Under the sixth plan, beginning 1974-1975, the guaranteed price was 
replaced by a stabilization price (SP), which was based on world prices. 
As before, if the per unit export returns exceeded SP, growers would pay 
a tax, generally equal to the price difference. When export returns fell 
short of SP, the difference was paid out of the stabilization fund to 
growers without any quantity limits on total exports. 
The appropriate price variable to include in a supply response 
equation is, therefore, a blend of the export price and the home 
consumption price, taking into account payments made into or out of the 
stabilization fund. Such a price variable specified by Spriggs (1978) 
and adapted for this study is defined as follows: 
(a) Under the.first five plans: 
If WGURP > EXPTP, 
- (WTUDOM * WHCP) + (WGURP * WGURQ) + EXPTP * (WEXPT - WGURQ) 
+ WEXPT) " 
If WGURP < EXPTP, 
- (WTUDOM * WHCP) + (EXPTP - TAX) * WEXPT 
(WTUDOM + WEXPT) 
where EFPRICE = effective price, 
WTUDOM = total domestic demand (a weight on the home consumption 
price), 
WHCP = home consumption price. 
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WGURP = guaranteed price, 
WGDRQ = guaranteed quantity on exports, 
EXPTP = export price, 
WEXPT = export quantity (a weight on export price), and 
TAX = export tax. 
(b) Under the sixth plan: 
-tjuotpt? - (wrUDOM * WHCP) + WEXPT * (EXPTP + S) 
W^TUDOM + WEXPT) * 
S is the difference between the stabilization price and the export price. 
S is either a receipt (SP > export price) or a tax (SP < export price). 
Other factors relevant to explaining wheat area planted in Australia 
are the following. Spriggs reports that the wheat-sheep zone in 
Australia,—which has over 90^ercent o^^ the wheat^area, also produces 
over 40 percent of the country's sheep. In a pasture-crop rotation, 
wheat and sheep may be complementary; but, beyond some rotation 
equilibrium, the two enterprises may substitute for each other on the 
basis of the relative prices of wheat and wool. The price of wool is, 
therefore, included in the area equation; its effect can be either 
positive or negative. 
A grain glut, which existed prior to and during 1969, prompted the 
introduction of quotas later that year; the quotas lasted until 1975-
1976. However, because these quotas were on deliveries to the AWB rather 
than on area planted, there is a question of their effectiveness in 
reducing total supplies. Nonetheless, a dummy variable is included to 
represent the quota period of 1971—1976. Finally, it is reported that 
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there was a dramatic increase in area planted over the period 1955-1974. 
This trend was largely due to technology and tax incentives for land 
clearing (Spriggs, 1978, p. 26). Another dummy variable is included to 
isolate this trend. 
Factors explaining the wheat food demand equation are real per 
capita income, real home consumption price, and the price of barley. 
Since, historically, feed prices have been set at the home consumption 
price, this variable is included in the feed demand equation, together 
with the price of barley and real per capita income. All stocks are held 
by the AWB, whose main objective is to assure adequate supplies to the 
domestic market; any surpluses after this obligation are exported. 
Although this objective may rule out speculative motive, Spriggs found a 
significant negative relation hètweèn stocks and export prices after 
allowing a minimum level for the domestic market. Stock demand is 
specified in this analysis as a function of production, export prices, 
and beginning stocks. A general specification of the Australian wheat 
model follows. 
Yield: WHYDADS = F^^(T, U14), 
Area: WHACAUS = F^^(REFPRICE, WORHPAU, DDM6773, DUM7175, 
WHACAUS_^, U15), 
Production: WHPDNAUS = WHYDAUS * WHACAUS, 
Food: WHFODAUS = F^gCWHCPAUS, RLINCAUS, BARFPAU, 016), 
Feed: WHFEDAUS = F^^CWHCPAUS, RLINCAUS, BARFPAU, U17), 
Stocks: WHESTAUS = Fjg(WHPDNAU, WHREXPAU, WHCPAUS, U18), 
Export price: WHREXPAU = F^^CRGULFUS, U19), and 
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Net exports: NETXAU = WHPDNAUS + lag(WHESTAUS) - (WHFODAUS + WHFEDAUS) 
* POPAUS - WHESTAUS. 
Endogenous variables 
WHYDAUS.= Australia, yield (MT/ha); 
WHACAUS = Australia, area harvested (ha); 
WHFODAUS = Australia, food use (kg/capita); 
WHFEDAUS = Australia, feed use (kg); 
WHPDNAUS = Australia, production (MT); 
WHESTAUS = Australia, ending stocks (MT); 
WHREXPAUS = Australia, export price (Aus $/MT); 
REFPRICE = Australia, real effective price (Aus $/MT); and 
NETXAM = Australia, net exports (MT). 
Exogenous variables 
WORHPAU = Australia, wholesale price of Wool (Aus $/l,OQO lbs); 
WHCPAUS = Australia, home consumption price (Aus $/MT); 
RLINCAUS = Australia, per capita income index; 
BABFPAU = Australia, barley farm price (Aus $/MT); 
DUM6773 = 1 for 1967 to 1973, 0 otherwise; 
DUM7175 = 1 from 1971 to 1975, 0 otherwise; 
U14-U19 = disturbance terms; and 
POPAUS = population, Australia. 
Wheat market in India 
A main feature of the Indian grain market is its segmentation into 
concessional and commercial markets. The government buys grain from 
growers, monopolizes imports, and together with stocks is able to channel 
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wheat to low—income consumers at a subsidized price. The two important 
policy prices of grain are, therefore, the procurement price (the price 
at which government buys grain) and the resale price (the price at which 
government grain is sold to ration cardholders). Krishna and Chhibber 
(1983) estimate that since the late 1970s, government has handled only 
about ten percent of total availability of grain, defined as the sum of 
production, net imports, and change in government stocks. Until 1966, 
imports were the main source for concessional sales. Then, between 1967 
and 1972, the Green Revolution enabled government to procure enough 
domestic wheat, increase stocks, and eliminate imports as a source for 
concessional sales. 
Although the system of grain procurement by the government varies 
from year to year, and from region to region, it is reported that "for 
wheat, the details of variations in purchase systems have little 
significance, because Punjab and Haryana, which contributed 60 to 90 
percent of all—India procurement in the decade 1967-1977, have purchased 
most of their grain in the open market at the prevailing price, with 
right of pre-emptive purchase exercised by government agents only 
occasionally" (Krishna and Chhibber, 1983, p. 15). There is, therefore, 
little difference between the procurement price and the market price for 
wheat. This suggests that farmers do not necessarily face a dual market, 
as consumers do. 
On the demand side, it is estimated that during the period 1961-
1973, the public system provided an average of 29 percent of per capita 
wheat consumed. This large volume of concessional sales, together with 
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wide variations in the subsidized price relative to the producer price 
(see Table 4.3), implies a dual market as modeled by Krishna and 
Chhibber. A single demand equation is estimated in this model because 
the data are not disaggregated according to the markets. Government 
activity is represented by a stock demand equation. 
The relation between the open market price and world prices is 
unclear. Jabara (1981) reports that commercial wheat prices have been 
generally at the world market equivalent since 1973. This contradicts 
Krishner and Chhibber who report that between 1964 and 1971, imported 
wheat was 14 to 34 percent cheaper than domestic wheat; but, after this 
period, imported wheat has been up to 52 percent more expensive. Data 
used here show that wheat farm prices in India have been below the import 
value since 1,973. The shift in the relative levels of prices of imported 
and domestic wheat can readily be attributed to the Green Revolution and 
^^input subsidies to producers. The test on internal price response to 
price levels in the rest of the world of the previous section was not 
rejected, indicating price insulation. The Indian wheat market is 
represented by the following general functions: 
Yield: WHYDIN = U20), 
Area: WHACIN = F^^(WHRFPIN_^ , RIRFPIN_^ , WHACIN_j^, DUM76 , U21) , 
Total use: WHTUIND: F^^(mRFPIN, RIRFPIN, INCRLIN, U22) , 
Stocks: WHESTIN = F^^(WHRFPIN, WHPDNIN, WHESTIN_^, U23), 
Net imports: NETMIN = (WHTUIND * POPIND) + WHESTIN - WHPDNIN 
- WHESTIN_^, and 
Production: WHPDNIN = WHYDIN * WHACIN. 
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Table 4.3. Ratios of the issue price to the procurement price and to the 
import price of wheat, 1961-1979^ 
Ratio of the 
Ratio of the issue price 
issue price to the to the 
Year procurement price import price 
1961 1.1134 1.1131 
1962 1.0769 1.0651 
1963 1.0000 1.0393 
1964 1.0000 0.9330 
1965 0.9222 1.2270 
1966 0.9266 1.2559 
1967 0.6416 0.7847 
1968 0.9365 1.2025 
1969 0.9989 1.3116 
1970 1.0263 1.3151 
1971 1.0263 1.3218 
1972 1.0263 0.8067 
1973 1.0526 0.7099 
1974 1.0354 0.7251 
1975 1.1905 0.7345 
197 6 1.1905 0.7702 
1977. 1.1364 0.6786 
1978 1.1148 0.6765 
1979 1.1148 0.6215 
^Source: Krishna and Chhibber (1983). 
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Endogenous variables 
WHYDIN = India, yield (MT/ha); 
WHACIN = India, area harvested (MT); 
WHTUIND = India, use (kg); 
WHESTIN = India, ending stocks (MT); 
WHPDNIN = India, production (MT); and 
NETMIN = India, net imports. (MT) . 
Exogenous variables 
WHRFPIN = India, farm price (Rupees/MT); 
RIRFPIN = India, rice farm price (Rupees/MT); 
INCRLIN = India, per capita income (Rupees); 
DUM76 = 1 in 1976, 0 elsewhere; 
POPIND = population; and 
II20—U23 = disturbance terms. 
Wheat policy in the European Community 
The Common Agricultural Policy of the E.G. allows domestic grain 
prices to vary between the target price and the intervention price. 
Target prices indicate price levels officials will prefer on the market; 
but, there is no commitment to enforce these prices. In fact, market 
prices are equivalent to the target price only when production falls 
short of domestic demand. In this situation, prices are determined by 
import prices. Grain imports, however, are allowed only at Che threshold 
price, which is the import price set high enough to guarantee the target 
price in the most grain deficit region of the Community, Duisburg. The 
difference between the import price (cif, Rotterdam) and the threshold 
/ 
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price is a levy on imports. The intercept term of the E.G. price linkage 
equation in Table 4.1 demonstrates the high levels of import levies in 
the E.E.C. High internal E.G. prices relative to world prices requires 
export subsidies. This has been the case for wheat in recent years. 
Koester estimates that between 1969 and 1973, high price support policy 
of the E.G. resulted in an additional 4 million tons of wheat produced, 
while reducing wheat utilization by 4.6 million tons. 
The three important E.G. policy prices, target, intervention, and 
the threshold, are determined annually and one will expect their levels 
to affect actual market prices. The intervention price is a floor price 
and, as a matter of policy, is set high enough to maintain actual market 
prices at relatively high levels. The target price is a ceiling price. 
As is the case in Australia and Canada, it is hard to determine which of 
the prices producers actually base their planting decisions on. The plot 
of the three policy prices, and the producer price (Figure 4.1), shows 
the producer price well below the intervention price in a number of 
years. Although the producer price may be low, actual producer receipts 
are higher due to subsidies. Without any data on subsidy payments, the 
appropriate price variable to use in an area equation becomes obscured. 
In the case of the E.G., however, fitting an area equation may not 
be appropriate because, despite the growth in production, area has 
remained fairly constant, varying between 10 and 11 million hectares per 
year for the 15—year estimation period. In fact, several specifications 
of the area equation did not give any satisfactory results. To allow for 
price response by producers, the yield equation is specified to 
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Figure 4.1. Producer and policy prices In the EEC 
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SOYMkP = soymeaL price per ton (ECU); and 
U24-U26 = disturbance terms. 
Wheat price policy in Japan 
Historically, vAeat production in Japan declined over the period 
1955 to 1971. This was due to a decline in "cropping ratio," which is 
the ratio of crop area to cultivated area, and is a measure of double 
cropping. The decline in cropping ratio is said to be a result of 
successful competition of the nonagricultural sector for available labor, 
reflected in the decline in agricultural labor from 19.3 million in 1955 
to 13.1 million in 1974 (Sanderson, 1978). The trend suggests a decline 
in the importance of wheat as a cash crop internally and, therefore, an 
increased reliance on wheat imports. 
The general agricultural price policy in Japan is to maintain high 
support prices for basic crops (including wheat). The government 
purchases wheat from farmers at a high support price and, together with 
imported wheat, resells to consumers at a lower price. The resale price 
is considered a weighted average of the support price and the import 
price. But, as is shown in Table 4.4, this was true until 1974. The 
figures show that for the abnormally high world prices of 1974-1975, the 
government selling price showed only a moderate increase from previous 
levels. In fact, the resale price was below the import price, amounting 
to a subsidy instead of a tax on imports. The resale price has since 
been below the import price. This apparent shift in policy was explained 
by Greenshields (1976) as a deliberate government policy to curb retail 
81 
Table 4.4. Japan: Government intervention prices and import price (cif) 
of wheat (1000 yen/MT) 
Government Government Government Government 
purchase selling Cif purchase selling as 
Year price price price as % of cif % of cif 
1965® 47 35 25 188 140 
1970 59 35 24 246 146 
1971 63 35 25 252 140 
1972 66 34 22 300 155 
1973 74 38 32 231 119 
1974 131 46 65 202 71 
1975 144 47 59 243 80 
1976 176 59 45 373 131 
1977*^ 169 37 39 433 95 
1978 174 40 49 355 82 
1979 178 - 41 64 278 64 
1980 192 41 68 282 60 
^Source: 1965—1976, Fred H. Sanderson (1978), Japan's Food 
Prospects and Policies. 
^Source: 1977-1980, F AO and International Wheat Council. 
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prices in 1974 and 1975. But, the permanent nature of this reversal 
seems to suggest a deliberate increase in subsidies for consumers. It 
further illustrates a policy of support for both consumers and producers, 
which is unlike the E.G. policy which allows high producer support prices 
to prevail, thus reducing consumption under conditions of 
overproduction. 
The wheat model specified here for Japan is similar to that used by 
Greenshields to evaluate the impact of a resale price increase on Japan's 
wheat imports. Greenshields endogenized only consumption. The model 
equations are: 
Food: WHFODJP = F^^CWHRESPJP, RIRFPJP, INCRLJP, U27), 
Ending stocks: WHESTJP = F^g(WHRESPJP, WHPDNJP, WHESTJP_^, U28), 
Resale-price :—WHRESPJP = F^gCRGULFUS DUM7480 , U29) and 
Net imports: NETMJP = ((WHFOJP/1,000) + WHFEJP) * POPJP + WHESTJP 
- WHESTJP , - WHPDNJP. 
— 1 
Endogenous variables 
WGFODJP = Japan, food use (kg); 
WHESTJP = Japan, ending stocks (MT); and 
WHRESPJP = Japan, resale price (year/MT), 
NETMJP = Japan, net imports (MT). 
Exogenous variables 
RIRFPJP = Japan, rice farm price (yen/Mï); 
INCRLJP = Japan, per capita income (yen); 
WHPDNJP = Japan, production (MT); 
DUM7480 = 1 in 1974—1980, 0 elsewhere; 
U27—U29 = disturbance terms; 
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WHFEJP = Japan, feed use (MT); and 
POPJP = Japan, population. 
Because the government sets both producer and consumer prices, both 
prices can be exogenous. However, the resale price is determined in part 
by the import price (at least prior to 1974) so it is linked to the U.S. 
price. A dummy variable is included to explain the shift in the relative 
levels of the resale and international prices. 
Other regions included in the model are the U.S.S.R., China, Eastern 
Europe, Other West Europe, Central Africa, Middle America, Other South 
America, and Other South Asia. However, the equations estimated for 
these regions are based entirely on the theoretical specifications of 
Chapter 3 because information on the internal markets of these regions is 
lacking. The regions are represented by the following equations in the 
model. 
U.S.S.R.: 
Production: WHPDUSR = F^qCT, U30). 
Food: WHFOUSR = (WHPDUSR, INCOMUSR, U31) . 
Feed: WHFEUSR = F^^(WHPDUSR, INCOMUSR, U32). 
Net imports: NETMUSR = WHFOUSR + WHFEUSR + WHESUSR 
- Lag(WHESUSR) - WHPDUSR. 
East Europe: 
Production: WHPDENE = F^gCl, U33). 
Total use: WHTUENE = Fg^(WHPDENE, INCOMENE, U34). 
Net imports : NETMENE = WHTUENE + WHESENE - WHESENE , 
- 1  
- WHPDENE. 
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China: 
Production: WHPDCHM = F^^CT, 035). 
Total Use: WHTUCHM = F^^CWHPDCHM, INCOMCHM, 036). 
Net imports: NETMCHM = WHTUCHM - WHPDCHM. 
Other West Europe: 
Yield: WHYDOWE + F^^CT, U37). 
Area: WHACOWE = F.^CWTDRPOWE ,, BARPOWE ,, U38). 
oo —1 —i 
Production: WHPDOWE = WHYDOWE * WHACOWE. 
Net imports: NETMOWE = WHTUOWE + WHESOWE - WHESOWS_^ 
- WHPDOWE. 
Central Africa: 
Total use: WHTUCAF = F^^CWTDRPCAF, CNRPCAF, INCCAF, U39). 
Net imports: NETMCAF = (WHTUCAF * POPCAF) + WHESCAF 
- WHESCAF , - WHPDCAF. 
—1 
Middle America: 
Total use: WHTUMAM = F^q(WHRFPME, CNRFPME, PCINCME» 040). 
Net imports: NETMMAM = (WHTUMAM * POPMAM) + WHESMAM 
- WHESMAM , - WHPDMAM. 
—1 
Other South America: 
Total use: WHTUOSAM = F^^(WTRPOSAM, CNRPOSAM, RLINCOSAM, 
U41) . 
Net imports: NETMOSAM = (WHTUOSAM* POPOSAM) - WHPDOSAM. 
Other South Asia: 
Total use: WHTUOSAS = F^^(WTRPOSAS, RIRPOSAS, INCOSAS, U42). 
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Net imports: NETMOSAS = (WHTUOSAS * POPOSAS) + WHESOSAS 
- WHESOSAS , - WHPDOSAS. 
—I 
Endogenous variables 
WHPDUSR = production, U.S.S.R. (MT); 
WHFODSR = food demand, U.S.S.R. (MT); 
WHPEUSR = feed demand, U.S.S.R. (MT); 
NETMUSR = net imports, U.S.S.R. (MT); 
WHPDENE = production. East Europe (MT); 
WHTUENE = total use. East Europe (MT); 
NETMENE = net imports. East Europe (MT); 
WHPDCHM = production, China (MT); 
WHTUCHM = total use, China (MT); 
NETMCHM = net imports, China (MT); 
WHYDOWE = yield Other West Europe (MT/Ha); 
WHACOWE = area harvested. Other West Europe (Ha); 
WHPDOWE = production. Other West Europe (MT); 
NETMOWE = net imports, Other West Europe (MT); 
WHTUCAF = total use. Central Africa (kg); 
NETMCAF = net imports. Central Africa (MT); 
WHTUMAM = total use. Middle America (kg); 
NETMMAM = net imports. Middle America (MT); 
WHTUOSAM = total use. Other South America (kg); 
NETMOSAM = net imports. Other South America (MT); 
WHTUOSAS = total use. Other South Asia (kg); and 
NETMOSAS = net imports. Other South Asia (MT). 
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Exogenous variables 
INCOMUSR = income, U.S.S.R. (index); 
WHESUSR = ending stocks, U.S.S.R. (MT); 
INCOMENE = income, East Europe (index); 
WHESENE = ending stocks. East Europe; 
INCOMCHM = income, China (index); 
WTDRPOWE = Other West Europe, weighted average wheat price (U.S. $/MT); 
BARPOWE = Other West Europe, weighted average barley price 
(U.S. $/MT); 
WHTUOWE = Other West Europe, total use (MT); 
WHESOWE = Other West Europe, ending stocks; 
WHRFPME = Mexico, wheat farm price (U.S. $/MT) ; 
CNRFPME = Mexico, corn farm price (U.S. $/MT); 
PCINCME = Mexico, per capita income (index); 
WHPDMAM = Middle America, production (MT); 
WHESMAM = Middle America, ending stocks (MT); 
POPMAM = Middle America, population; 
WTRPOSAM = Other South America, weighted average wheat price 
(U.S. $/MT); 
CNRPOSAM = Other South America, weighted average corn price 
(U.S. $/MT); 
RLINCOSAM = Other South America, weighted average corn price 
(U.S. $/MT); 
POPOSAM = Other South America, population; 
WHPDOSAM = Other South America, production (MT); 
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WTDRPCAF = Central Africa, weighted average wheat price (U.S. $/MT); 
CNRPCAF = Central Africa, weighted average corn price (U.S. $/MT); 
INCCAF = Central Africa, per capita income (index); 
POPCAF = Central Africa, population; 
WHPDCAF = Central Africa, production (MT); 
WHESCAF = Central Africa, ending stocks; 
WTRPOSAS = Other South Asia, weighted average wheat price (U.S. $/M.T) ; 
RIRPOSAS = Other South Asia, weighted average price (U.S. $/MT); 
INCOSAS = Other South Asia, per capita income index; 
POPOSAS = Other South Asia, population; 
WHPDOSAS = Other South Asia, production (MT); and 
WHESOSAS= Other South Asia, ending stocks (MT). 
Model Estimation 
The model was estimated in two steps. The first step involved using 
the ordinary least squares estimation method to estimate single 
behavioral equations and determine which economic variables to include in 
the final model, based on economic response (signs of coefficients and 
statistical significance)- Alternative functional forms were also 
specified to determine equations with the best fit. The second step 
involved estimating the final model as a nonlinear system, using the two-
stage least squares method. 
Assumptions of the ordinary least squares method are : 
(a) Y = XS + U: a linear model. 
(b) E(U) = 0: disturbance terms have zero means. 
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2 (c) EUU' = O I: disturbance terms are homoscedastic and 
uncorrelated. 
(d) Plim E^X'U = 0: disturbance terms are uncorrelated with the 
fixed explanatory variables, X. 
Assumptions (a), (c), and (d) do not hold for this model. The model 
includes at least nonlinear identities. Simultaneity of the system and 
presence of endogenous variables (current and lagged) as explanatory 
variables violate assumptions (c) and (d), resulting in estimators that 
are not consistent. Also, because variables in other equations are 
excluded from the single equation estimation, information is lost and the 
ordinary least squares estimators are biased. The method of two—stage 
least squares replaces the explanatory endogenous variables with 
estimates of their reduced forms, which are uncorrelated with the 
disturbance terms. More information in the system is also incorporated 
in the estimation because the second-stage instrumental variables are 
constructed as ordinary least squares estimates of the endogenous 
variable, using all the exogenous variables in each equation. 
However, the student t-statistics of two-stage least squares 
estimates are valid only asymptotically because the least squares 
assumptions are satisfied in the probability limit. The presence of 
lagged endogenous variables as exogenous variables also limits the 
meaning of the D.W. statistic. 
Results of both single-equation estimation and simultaneous two-
stage least squares estimation are reported. As mentioned earlier, the 
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purpose of the ordinary least squares estimation was to guide in the 
choice of appropriate variables and functional forms for equations. 
However, the choice of functional forms for nearly all behavioral 
equations in the nonlinear estimation was restricted to linear forms. 
The computer program used to solve the system tended to "wander" without 
convergence for the strictly nonlinear functions estimated by ordinary 
least squares. Fortunately, the behavioral response of the explanatory 
variables did not change with this functional restriction; also, there 
was not much loss in quality of fit of the equations. In the following 
sections, both ordinary least squares and two-stage least squares 
estimates of the model are presented by region. 
U.S.A. 
Table 4,5a presents OLS and two-stage least squares estimates of the 
U.S. wheat model. From the OLS estimates, both coefficients of the wheat 
and sorghum prices in the area equation are significant, with 
elasticities of 0.576 and -0.513, respectively. The effective support 
rate variable is also significant but has the wrong sign. The own price 
effect on food demand is not significant but barley price is, with a 
cross-price elasticity of 0.118. Income is also significant with an 
elasticity of 0.124. No coefficient in the feed equation is significant 
at the five percent level; also, all but the income and sorghum price 
coefficients have the expected sign. In the stocks equation, price and 
production are significant at one percent; government stocks also have 
Table 4.5a. Ordinary least squares estimates of the U.S. v^eat model 
I D.W. 
(4.1) log(WHYDUS) = 0.502 + 0.016 T 0.72 1.01 
(6.674)*** 
(4.2) log(WHACUS) = 7.637 + 0.576 log(WHRFPUS_, ) - 0.513 log(SORFPUS_,) 
(4.599)** (-2.703)* 
[0.576]^ [-0.513] 
+ 0.59 log(WHACUS_,) - 0.248 log(WHRSPUS) 0.92 1.92 
(4.882)** (-2.006)* | 
(4.3) log(WHFODUS) = -4.670 + 0.029 log(WHRFPUS) + 0.118 log(lNCRLUS) 0.89 1.23 
(0.702) (2.775)* 
[0.03] [0.12] 
I 
(4.4) log(WHFEDUS) = -11.232 - 1.423 log(WHRFPUS) - lio42 log(lNCRLUS) 
(-1.227) (-0i606) 
[1.42] [-1104] 
+ 1.055 DUM73 + 2.705 log(CATFEDUS) 0.72 2.53 
(1.705) 
(4.5) WHESTUS = 3,878.357 - 150.951 WHRFPUS + 0.117 WHGOVST + 0.253 WHPDNUS 0.89 1.32 
(-5.574)** (1.823) | (5.674)** 
[-0.68] 
^Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics. 
^Numbers in brackets indicate elasticity at the mean. 
*Significant at five percent. 
**Signifleant at one percent. 
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some effect, although the coefficient is not very significant. Evidence 
of serial correlation is shown in the yield, food, and feed equation. 
The two-stage least squares results of Table 4.5b represent 
modifications of the OLS specification. Due to nonconvergence of 
estimates, the behavioral equations are restricted to linear forms. Food 
use is exogenized. A price equation is estimated as an inverted function 
of the feed equation, and feed use is computed as an identity. The 
manipulation is necessary since the computer program requires that each 
endogenous variable appear once on the left-hand side of the system of 
equations• 
The results differ only slightly from the OLS estimates. Both the 
effective support rat^ and diversion payments of^he area ^uation are 
not significant. Own—price and cross-price elasticities of the area 
equation are 0.454 and —0.412, respectively. Gallagher et al. estimated 
own and cross-price elasticities of 0.51 and -0.14, respectively, for 
winter wheat. Elasticities of the feed equation are -7.93 and 7.13 for 
wheat and sorghum prices, respectively. Both of these are extremely 
large compared to corresponding values of —3.29 and 1.62, estimated by 
Gallagher et al. Ending stocks are also responsive to price and 
production, but not to farmer—owned reserve levels. Finally, an 
elasticity of 0.88 is estimated for the linkage between U.S. farm price 
and the gulf port price. 
Table 4.5b. Structural parameter estimates of wheat model, U.S. 
D.W. 
(4.6) WHRFPUS = 20.347 - 775.381 WHFEDUS + 1.210 SORFPUS + 0.002 INCRLUS - 43.87 DUM73 
(-2.03)*^ (4.42)** 
+ 0.002 CATFED 
(0.49) 
(0.40) 
(4.7)C WHFEDUS = 0.26 - 0.0013 WHRFPUS + 0.0015 SORFPUS + (3.0)xl0 ^  INCRLUS 
[-7.93]^ [7.15] [1.36] 
- 0.057 DUM73 + (2.6x10"^) CATFEDUS | 
0.95 2.17 
(4.8) WHACUS = 10,393.950 + 108.442 WHRFPUS., - 131.375 SORFPUS_, - 48.01 WHRSPUS 
(2.72)* (-1.59) (-1.05) 
[0.45] [-0.412] [-0.188] 
+ 0.724 WHACUS_^ - 19.091 WHRDWUS 
(4.50)** (-0.50) 
[-0.007] 
(4.9) WHESTUS = 19,821.176 - 165.478 WHRFPUS + 0.373 WHPDNUS + 0.146 WHFORUS 
(-5.74) 
[-0.743] 
(4.10) RGULFUS = 15.127 + 1.099 WHRFPUS 
(2.93) (22.00)** 
10.88] 
(2.49)* (0.52) 
0.88 2.25 
0 .82  2 .2 8  
0.98 2.59 
^Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics. 
^Numbers in brackets indicate elasticity at the mean. 
^Derived by solving (4.6) for feed quantity. 
*Significant at five percent. 
**Significant at one percent. 
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Canada 
Ordinary least squares estimates of the Canada wheat model equation 
ar.e in Table 4.6a. The food equation has a poor fit, possibly because of 
the low variability in the food use variable. The food variable has a 
coefficient of variation of 8.96, compared to 16.11 for feed. Food use 
is made exogenous in the final model. A large part of the variability in 
area harvested is explained by the lagged adjustment and the effect of 
the inventory reduction program of 1973. Both coefficients of wheat and 
barley prices have t-values just above one, but do have the expected 
signs. Neither the off-board price nor the Canadian Board's initial 
payments gave better results than the realized price. A grain price 
effect is also lacking in the feed equation, but the price of beef has a 
relatively stronger effect. Finally, the stocks equation is explained 
largely by total supplies, represented by current production and 
beginning stocks. The export price has a more significant effect on 
ending stocks than the off—board price, and is included in the final 
estimation instead of the off-board price. 
Again, two-stage least squares estimates of Table 4.6b are similar 
to the ordinary least squares equations, though the functional forms are 
different. Price coefficients in the area equation have slightly higher 
t-values. The stock demand equation is different from the preliminary 
ordinary least squares in two ways. First, a dummy variable, equal to 
zero in 1967, 1968, and 1969, and one elsewhere, is added because of 
extremely high stock levels in those three years. Second, the production 
variable is replaced with export price to allow for a response in stocks 
Table 4.6a. Ordinary least squares estimates of the Canadian wheat model 
i 2 
R"^ D.W. 
(4.11) log(WHYDCA) = 0.469 + 0.010 T 0.14 1.69 
(1.436)* 
(1.278) 
10.281® 
(-1.335) 
1-0.28] 
+ 0.473 log(WHACCA_,) - 0.759 LIFT 
(4.811)* (-8.375)** 
(4.13) log (VÏHFODCA) = -1.959 + 0.046 log(WHRMP) + 0.027 log(lNCRLCA) 
(0.465) (0.118) 
[0.05] [0.63] 
(4.14) log(WHFEDCA) = 1.365 - 0.133 log(WHRFPCA) - 0.181 log(BARFPGA) 
(-0.441) (-0.668) 
[-0.13] [-0.18] 
+ 0.711 log(CATRPCA) 
(3.918)* 
[0.71] I 
(4.15) log(WHESTCA) = -10.002 - 0.178 log(WHRFPCA) + 0.760 log(WHPDNCA) 
(-0.603) (2.300)* 
[-0.18] [0.76] 
+ 0.889 log(WHESTCA_,) | 
(2.979)* 
0.92 2.25 
0.04 1.35 
0.75 2.31 
0.75 1.80 
^Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics. 
^Numbers in brackets indicate elasticity at the mean. 
*Significant at five percent. 
**Significant at one percent. 
Table 4.6b. Structural parameter estimates of wheat model, Canada 
R'" D.W. 
(4.16)) WHACCA = 4,565.506 + 32.185 WHRRPCA , - 61.373 BARFPCA_, + 0.649 WHACCA , 
(1.85)* ' ' " 
[0.35]b 
( - 1 . 6 6 )  
1-0.43 
(4.38)** 
- 6,281.389 LIFT 
(-6.23)** 
(4.17) WHFEDCA = 9.232 + 15.169 (-$51$^) + 1.092 CATRPCA 
'BARFPCA 
(1.05) 
[0.351 
(2.40)* 
[0.56] 
(4.18) WHESTCA = 17,804.5 - 7,020.478 DUM6769 + 0.404 
(-3.70)* (2.23)* 
WHESTCA_, - 27 .068 WHREXPGA 
( - 1 . 2 8 )  
10.271 
0 .88  2 .68  
0.48 1.46 
0.86 2.55 
(4.19) WHRRPCA = -9.958 + 0.88 WHREXPGA 0.89 0.64 
(-0.70) (9.61)** 
(1.141 
(4.20) WHREXPCA = -25.497 + 1.357 (|||g|||) (REXCANA 4 real exchange rate index, Canada) 0.96 1.84 
(-2.380)(16.460)** 
[1.18] 
^Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics. 
^Numbers in brackets indicate elasticity at the mean. 
*Significant at five percent. 
**Significant at one percent. 
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to price changes. Also, more reasonable estimates of coefficients on 
price and lagged stocks are obtained without the production variable. 
The coefficient on lagged stocks is less than one and that on price is 
negative and significant at a ten percent significance level. 
Canada export price is linked to the U.S. gulf port price; the price 
transmission elasticity is approximately one. The realized board price 
is linked to the export price with a price transmission elasticity of 
approximately one. 
Australia 
Table 4.7a presents estimates of the Australia wheat model 
equations. Like Canada, there is no significant trend in yields; the 
log—linear equation for yield shows an average growth rate of only 1.6 
percent over the estimation period. The coefficient of the effective 
price variable in the area equation is significant only at ten percent, 
but the elasticity of 0.34 is reasonable. The substitute price effect is 
stronger, with an elasticity of -0.53. The price of wool has a positive 
effect; though this may represent the complementarity between wheat area 
and pasture discussed earlier, the true nature of its effect is not 
clear. On the demand side, both price and income effects are significant 
with t—values about 2.0 in the feed equation; but, this is not reflected 
2 in an R of 58 percent- This may be the effect of low variability in 
food use. The food use variable has a coefficient of variation of 5.32, 
compared to 38.61 for feed use. In fact, although the feed equation has 
2 
an R of 73 percent, only income and barley price coefficients have 
Table 4.7a. Ordinary least squares estimates of the Australia wheat model 
I D.W. 
(4.21) log(WHYDAUS) = 15.894 + 0.016 T I 
(1.817)* 
(4.22) log(WHACAUS) = 15.095 + 0.338 log(REFPRlCE) - 6.525 log(BARFPAUS) 
(1.898) (-2.130)* 
[0.34]^ [-0.53] 
+ 0.452 log(WORHPAU) + 0.345 DUM6773 
(2.73)* (2.720)* 
(0.45] 
(4.23) log(WHFODAUS) = -0.604 - 0.386 log(WHCPAU) - 0|l99 log(RLINCAUS) 
(-2.392)* (21888)* 
1-0.39] [-0i20] 
- 0.099 DUM77 
(-2.317)* 
(4.24) log(WHESTAUS) = -10.350 - 2.441 log(WHREXPAU) + 2.015 log(WHPDNAU) 
( -2 .660)* 
[-2.44] 
(3.030)* 
0.20 0.90 
0.89 2.60 
0.58 1.32 
0.79 1.31 
^Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics. 
^Numbers in brackets indicate elasticity at the mean. 
*Significant at five percent. 
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t-values above one. The stock equation is explained largely by export 
price and current production. 
Final structural equations estimated for Australia are presented in 
Table 4.7b. The coefficient of wool price is still positive as was the 
case of the preliminary OLS estimate. The coefficient of the home 
consumption price in the feed demand equation has the wrong sign, but 
there is a strong substitution effect between wheat and barley. The t-
statistic on the income coefficient is just above one, although an income 
elasticity of 0.964 is high. 
Price transmission between U.S. gulf port and Australia export 
prices is high with an elasticity of 1.19. The real effective price is 
linked to the export price from 1975 to 1980. This is because the 
effective price series is fairly stable before 1975 but varies more 
closely with the export price from then on. The pattern of correlation 
between the two prices is a reflection of the shift to the sixth 
stabilization plan in Australia. The price coefficient in stocks 
equation is not significant, although it has the desired sign. This 
is not surprising since Spriggs (1978) reports that the objective of 
the Australia Wheat Board officials regarding stocks is to ensure 
adequate supply to the domestic market first, before exporting, 
suggesting that only a portion of stocks may be responsive to export 
prices. 
Table 4.7b. Structural parameter estimates of wheat model, Australia 
[0.75]° 
+ 6,454.089 DUM67773 
( 2 . 6 0 ) *  
[0.70] [0.48] 
(4.26) WHFEDAUS = -144.434 + 905.833 RHCPAU + 808.046 
(1.16) (2.37)* 
[1.875] [1.56] 
BARFPAUS + 49.104 RLINCAUS 
(1.05) 
[0.964] 
(4.27) WHESTAUS = 5,731.358 - 9,012.87 WHREXPAU + 0.315 WHPDNAU - 5,323 DUM6970 
(-0.78) 
[-0.380] 
(2.87)* (-5.70)** 
(4.28) WHREXPAU = -18.499 + 0.880 (-§0%^) (REXAUS =|real exchange rate index, 
'REXAUS 
(-2.66) (17.63)** 
[1.19] 
(4.29) REFPRICE = -12.806 + 1.359 WHREXPAU 
(4.59)** 
[1.41] 
Australia 
R'' D.W. 
(4.25) WHACAUS = -3,269.441 + 70.011 REFPRICE + 991.150 WORHPAU - 53.098 BARFPAUS 
(3.26)** (2.90)* (-2.23)* 
0.67 
0.65 
1.63 
2.46 
0.86 2.63 
0.96 1.72 
0.88 0.83 
^Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics. | 
^Numbers in brackets indicate elasticity at the mean. 
*Significant at five percent. 
**Significant at one percent. 
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India 
Equations estimated for the Indian wheat market are presented in 
Table 4.8a. Elasticities estimated by the ordinary least squares method 
are compared to those estimated by Krishna and Chhibber in Table 4.9. 
The biggest difference in these estimates is in the substsitute price 
elasticity and the income elasticity. This study uses the price of rice 
as the substitute price, and real per capita GNP as the income variable; 
while the other uses the average price of barley and grain as the 
substitute price, and per capita expenditure as the income variable. 
Also, the wheat price variable in the earlier study is a weighted average 
of concessional and commercial prices. 
The results show a strong yield trend with a growth of 3.5 percent. 
Coefficients of both wheat and rice prices in the area equation are 
significant at five percent, with elasticities of 0.348 and -0.546, 
respectively. The stocks equation has very low explanatory power; only 
coefficients of production and beginning stocks have t-values above 1.0. 
Stocks are exogenized in the aggregate model presented in Table 4.8b for 
India. 
Two—stage least squares estimates of both area and food equations 
are very good in terms of behavioral response. Own price elasticity of 
0.125 on area harvested is rather small. Also, the coefficient of lagged 
area is restricted to one because the unrestricted estimate was 
consistently greater than one. The income coefficient in demand is not 
significant and the implied income elasticity of 0.133 is small. Also, 
the demand equation estimated by two—stage least squares is food use 
Table 4.8a. Ordinary least squares estimates of the India wheat model 
D.W. 
(4.30) WHYDIN = 0.932 + 0.041 T 
(6.970)* 
(4.31) WHACIN = 645.161 + 4,605.319 WHRFPIN_, - 7,310.890 RIRFPIN_. + 1.186 WHACIN_, 
(3.793)* (-3.852)* (13.990) 
[0.35]* [-0.55] 
0.79 1.05 
+ 3,627.249 DUM76 
(5.486) 
(4.32) log(WHTUIND) = -0.891 - 0.707 log(WHRFPIN) + 0.392 log(RIRFPIN) 
(-4.538)* (1.701) 
[0.71] (0.391 
+ 0.394 log(RLINGIN) 
(1.345) 
[0.39] I 
(4.33) WHESTIN = -6,887.686 + 3,844.596 WHRFPIN + 0.195 WHPDNIN + 0.445 WHESTIN . 
(0.719) (1.092) (1.391) 
0.98 1.86 
0 . 8 6  2 . 2 1  
0.48 1.21 
^Numbers in perentheses are t-statistics. 
^Numbers in brackets indicate elasticity at the mean. 
*Significant at five percent, 
Table 4.8b. Structural parameter estimates of the India wheat model 
D.W. 
(4.34) WHAGIN = 7,013.661 + 1,660.5 WHRFPIN_, - 6,503j04 RIRFPIN_, + 1.0 WHAGIN_, 
(1.77)* (-2j78)* 
[0.125]° [-0.49] 
+ 3,500.392 DUM76 0.97 3.20 
(4.13)** 
(4.35) WHFODIN = 60.013 - 25.548 WHR1?PIN + 11.174 RIRFPIN + 0.005 RLINCIN 0.75 2.73 
(-3.360)* (1.131) (0.243) 
[-0.78] [0.34] [0.13] 
^Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics. 
^Numbers in brackets indicate elasticity at the mean. 
*Significant at five percent. 
**Significant at one percent. 
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Table 4.9. Elasticity comparisons between models 
Krishna and Chhibber^ This study 
Own price elasticity of demand -0.06 -0.71 
Price elasticity of substitute 
in demand -0.61 0.39 
Income elasticity 2.95 0.39 
Price elasticity of area harvested 0.19 0.35 
Price elasticity of substitution 
(area harvested) -0.12 -0.55 
^Krishna and Chhibber (1983). 
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demand and not total use (food plus feed) as was estimated by ordinary 
least squares procedures. 
E.E.C. 
Table 4.10 represents two-stage least squares estimates of E.G. 
structural parameters. The food demand equation is strictly nonlinear, 
and includes wheat intervention price and per capita income as 
explanatory variables. Both of these have coefficients significant at 
five percent; the associated elasticities of -0.067 and -0.046 for price 
and income, respectively, are reasonable. For feed use, only the 
intervention price is significant at five percent, but cattle and soymeal 
2 price coefficients have t-values above one. R s of both food and feed 
equations are rather low. The only behavioral equation on the supply 
side is a yield equation discussed previously. The elasticity of yield 
with respect to the price variable is 1.11. 
Japan 
Ordinary least squares estimated equations for food and stocks are 
in Table 4.11a. Coefficients of the price of rice are not significant; 
this may be because the rice price variable is the farm price and not the 
resale price. Only the resale price is significant in the stocks 
equation; this equation is dropped in the final model because of a poor 
fit. So, the structural equations for Japan are food demand and the 
linkage between the resale price and U.S. gulf port price (Table 4.11b). 
The price of rice is dropped from the demand equation. The linear 
Table 4.10. Structural parameter estimates of wheat trade model, E.E.C. 
D.W. 
(4.36) WHFOEC = 95.239 - 0.067 (REFSPEC) - 0.046 (RLINCEC) 0.46 1.40 
(-2.20)* (-3.43)* 
[-0.007]b [-0.05] 
(4.37) WHFEEC = 23.193 - 442.09 REFSPEC + 0.582 CATRPEC + 15.394 DUM75 
(-2.02)* (1.27) 
[-1.46] [1.39] 
+ 0.052 RSMPEC • 0.53 2.28 
(1.29) 
[ 0 . 2 1 ]  
WHDRTHR 
(4.38) WHYDEC = 1.543 + 0.006 (Lag(FERTINDX)^ + 0.070 T 0.78 1.10 
(1.438) (3.789)* 
[0.42] 
^Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics. 
^Numbers in brackets indicate elasticity at the mean. 
*Significant at five percent. 
**Significant at one percent. 
Table 4.11a. OLS parameter estimates of wheat trade model, Japan 
D.W. 
(4.39) log(WHFODJP) = -2.799 + 0.07 log(RLINCJP) - 0.052 log(WHRESPJP) 
(3.602)* (-2.114) 
[0.07] b [0.05] 
- 0.013 log(RIRFPJP) 
(-0.308) 
[0.01] 
(4.40) WHESTJP = 2,462.809 - 27.822 WHRESPJP - 0.03 WHPDNJP - 0.011 WHESTJP , 
(-4.634) (-0.344) (-0.052) 
[2.787] 
0.84 2.01 
0.91 2.50 
^Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics. 
h 
Numbers in brackets indicate elasticity at the mean. 
Table 4.11b. Structural parameter estimates of wheat trade model, Japan 
D.W. 
(4.41) WHFODJP = 49.410 - 0.024 WHRESPJP + 0.003 RLINCJP 0.80 2.11 
(-2.25)** (1.98)* 
[ - 0 . 06 ]»  [0 .06 ]  
(4.42) WHRESPJP = 115,505.9 + 259.868 (RGULFUS/REXJApC) - 44,387.4 DUM7380 0.80 1.87 
(2.75)* (-6.08)** 
[0.231 
^Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics. 
^Numbers in brackets indicate elasticity at the mean. 
^REXJAP = real exchange rate index, Japan. 
*Significant at five percent. 
**Significant at one percent. 
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estimates of the two—stage least squares method are close to the double 
log specification of the ordinary least squares method. Price and income 
elasticities of wheat food demand are -0.06 and 0.06, respectively. 
Estimates for other regions 
In Table 4.12, the structural equation of the Central Planned 
economies are estimated by ordinary least squares, while the others are 
two-stage least squares estimates. Only the coefficient of production is 
significant in the use equations of East Europe (4.43) and China (4.44). 
The relative variability of food and feed variables was a major factor in 
estimating separate equations for feed and food uses in the Soviet Union. 
Food use has a coefficient of variability of 4.3, compared to 19.16 for 
feed. Equations 4.45 and 4.46 show that food use is affected more by 
production and income, while feed use is explained by income and imports. 
These equations for the Central Planned regions are incorporated in the 
aggregate model in their exact forms so parameters are not reestimated. 
Except for the negative income coefficients in the demand equations 
of Other South American and Other South Asia, estimates of equations for 
the remaining regions (Table 4.13) are satisfactory. Only the intercept 
term of demand equation for Mid America (4.48) is estimated since the 
elasticities on wheat and corn prices, and income are restricted. 
Model Validation 
Although the estimated model is valid on the basis of economic 
meaning associated with the estimates, for simulation purposes, it can be 
Table 4.12. Ordinary least squares estimated demand equations, China, East Europe and the U.S.S.R. 
D.W. 
(4.43a) WHTUCHM = -1,309,181 + 0.794 WHPDNCIIM + 0.181 INCOMCHM 0.98 1.03 
(5.576)* (2.727)* 
(4.43b) WHPDCHM = 17,425,549 + 2,607,793 T 0.47 2.16 
(6.40)* (9.01)** 
(4.44a) log(WHTUENE) = -16.729 + 0.885 logWHPDNENE - 0.375 logINCOMENE 0.92 0.61 
(0.885) (-1.73) 
(4.44b) WHPDENE = 23,941,697 + 734,220.5 T 0.87 2.62 
(12.40)** (3.58)** 
(4.45) WHFOUSR = 35,260,760 + 0.129 WHPDNUSR + 0.580 INCOMUSR 0.66 1.85 
(2.641)* (3.557)* 
(4.46) WHFEUSR = -3,600,626 + 0.09 WHPDNUSR + 1.205 INCOMUSR + 989,969 DUM7980 0.84 1.62 
(1.455) (4.750)** (1.843) 
(4.47) WHPDUSR = 83,907,551 + 997,279.8 T 0.02 2.47 
(9.90)** (1.11) 
^Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics. 
*Significant at five percent. 
**Significant at one percent. 
Table 4.13. Structural parameter estimates of trade model, other regions 
D.W. 
(4.48a) WHACOWE = 2,650,810 + 34,363.28 WTDRPOWE_, - 21,783.8 BARFPOWE, 0.94 2.90 
(5.30)*** I (2.31)* 
[0.947]^ [-0.445] 
(4.48b) WHYDOME = 1.347 + 0.067 T 0.76 2.38 
(13.20) (6.17) 
(4.49) WHTUMAM = 25.284 (WHRFPME)"®*^ (CNRFPME)®'^ (PCINCME)^'^ 
(73.72) 
^Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics. 
^Numbers in brackets indicate elasticity at the mean. 
^Significant at five percent. 
**Significant at one percent. 
0.72 1.09 
(4.50) WHTUOSAM = 109.677 - 100.416 WTRPOSAM + 42.622 CNRPOSAM - 0.298 RLINCOSAM 0.59 3.24 
(-1.19) (0.81) (-2.54) 
[-0.20] [0.07] [-0.004] 
(4.51) WHTUCAF = -7.039 - 58.515 WTDRPCAF + 60.607 DNRPCAF + + 17.371 INCCAF 0.69 1.70 
(-2.16)* (1.11) (2.97)* 
[-1.13] [0.817] [2.23] 
(4.52) WHTUOSAS = 40.376 - 3.228 WTRPOSAS + 20.393 RIRPOSAS - 20.507 INCOSAS 0.49 2.05 
(-0.24) (1.50) (-2.25) 
[-0.05] [0.32] [-0.88] 
Ill 
evaluated further on the basis of fit of the individual endogenous 
variables. The first of several criteria used for such evaluation 
is the root mean square simulation (rms) error, which measures zl'ie 
deviation of simulated variable from its actual time path. The rms error 
for a variable is defined (Pindyke and Rubinfeld, 1981, p. 326) as; 
Root mean square percent error is preferred over the absolute rms because 
the latter depends on the size of the variable. 
Another statistic based on the rms error is Theil's inequality 
coefficient defined as 
t=l 
where P^ = simulated value of A^, and 
T = number of periods of simulation. 
A variation of the rms error is the rms percent error, which also 
measures deviation of P^ from A^ but expressed in relative terms 
U = 
J\ E (P;)2 
t=l 
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U is equivalent to the rms error scaled such that 0_<U_<1. IfU=0, 
and there is a perfect fit. If U = 1, is as bad as it can be. 
Although the statistic U alone gives a good indication of the overall fit 
of the model, it is usually partitioned into three components, which 
better indicate sources of errors in the model. The following 
decomposition of the rms, derived from Theil (1961), forms the basis for 
the measures of fit of forecasts used to evaluate the model. 
?Z(P^ - = (P -Â)^ + (S - rS.)2 + (1 - r^)S. (4.52) 
i t  t  p  A  A  
where = standard deviation of P^, 
= standard deviation of A^, 
r = correlationcoefficient between A^ and P^,and 
P and A = mean values. 
The relation between P^. and A^ is represented by the regression model: 
A^ = gP^ + Uj. (4.53) 
2 
where EU = 0, = 1, and 3 = -%—. For a perfect forecast, 0=1. 
^ P 
(P — A) in (4.52) represents bias in forecasts and, given that the 
model in (4.53) holds, EA^ = EP^, and (P - A) = 0. The term (S^ - rS^) 
in (4.52) is related to the correlation between predicted and actual 
values and is rewritten as: 
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given the least squares estimator in (4.53) and the condition that = 1, 
this second term vanishes. The unsquared right-hand side terms of (4.52) 
are redefined as: 
s - rS, /(I - r^ )S 
"M - "e - '' D *= % 5— 
where D is the denominator of Theil's inequality coefficient TJ. U, 
therefore, becomes: 
* = + *D 
or 
u" + + U° = T; (4.54) 
where 
u" = -f; = -j; U° = 
U U U 
measures the proportion of mean square error due to bias in the 
forecast P^. is proportion of rms due to errors in the regressin of A 
on P. If the regression satisfies (4.53) where = 1, then is zero as 
was previously established. is the proportion of rms due to the 
disturbance term and ideally, the mean square error should result 
entirely from this unsystematic term. It was shown that for a perfect 
forecast, (P — A) = 0 and S - rS. = 0. Expression (4.54), therefore, 
P A 
implies that the desired relative levels of U^, and is (0, 0, 1). 
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The rms errors and rms percent errors of the model are presented in 
Table 4.14. Theil's measures of fit of a dynamic simulation of the model 
are presented in Table 4.15. 
Half of the 42 endogenous variables have rms percent errors equal to 
0.1 or less while 34 have rms percent errors around 0.25 or less. 
Variables with very large rms percent errors include net imports of India 
and Other West Europe, net exports of the E.G. (all of which are 
determined by identities); and ending stocks in Australia and U.S. feed 
use. Probably the only variable of concern is Australia stocks because 
it is represented by a behavioral equation, and Australia stock levels 
are quite sizeable and variable. However, all the endogenous price 
variables have rms percent errors at 0.2 or less. Also, the internal and 
external market variable of the most important world wheat supplier, the 
U.S., have very low rms values. 
Theil's forecast error decomposition measures in Table 4.15 also 
show very good predictability of the model for most of the endogenous 
variables. Again, 35 out of 42 endogenous variables have U^ values above 
0.5C, while all U.S. variables, except feed use (which is very small) 
have U^ values above 0.80. Endogenous price variables of Canada and 
Australia also have U^ values between 0.7 and 0.8. So, based on the rms 
error and the related statistics, the model does very well in reproducing 
the historical data. 
A final criterion for evaluating model accuracy is its ability to 
predict turning points in the actual data series. Figures 4.2-4.8 are 
plots of actual and simulated prices in the U.S., Canada, and Australia, 
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Table 4.14. Statistics of fit 
Variable N RMS error RMS % error 
WHTUOSAS 14 3.11906 0.141752 
WHFEEC 14 3.67433 0.0931866 
WHFOEC 14 0.772986 0.00707695 
WHTUOSAM 14 1.66502 0.022828 
WHACOWE 14 168,978 0.0320511 
WHACCA 14 915,526 0.0992844 
WHTUCAFU 14 0.679183 0.101749 
WHTUMAMU 14 2.23084 0.0497293 
WHFEDANU 14 11.407 0.253764 
WHACIN 14 494,608 0.030448 
FODINDU 14 2.85015 0.0688695 
WHACUS 14 1,905,246 0.0847887 
NETMOSAS 14 562,203 0.619077 
NETMOSAM 14 103,005 0.0394836 
WHPDOWE 14 326,973 0.0320511 
WHPDNCA 14 1,702,463 0.0992844 
NETMCAF 14 194,608 0.157051 
NETMMAM 14 174,672 0.216258 
PRODIND 14 607,657 0.030448 
WHPDNUS 14 4,048,700 0.0847887 
NETXEC 14 1,091,824 1.88645 
NETMOWE 14 335,991 1.35464 
NÈTMIND 14 1,521,186 2.69795 
WHESUS 14 3,390,309 0.167085 
WHPDNAN 14 1,094,874 0.106207 
WHREXPAN 14 19.3394 0.196718 
NETXAN 14 1,880,498 0.241088 
WHRESPJP 14 15,988.1 0.110099 
WHESTCA 14 1,679,435 0.143463 
WHACANZ 14 991,359 0.106207 
RGULFUS 14 17.7619 0.161123 
REFPRICE 14 11.6569 0.0972998 
NETXCA 14 2,774,045 0.243232 
WHESTAN 14 1,003,694 1.40416 
WHFEDCA 14 13,1221 0.151257 
WHFEDUS 14 0.0205088 1.85147 
WHRFPUS 14 17.1665 0.203172 
WHFODJP 14 0.523996 0.0105035 
WHREXPCA 14 23.1675 0.19342 
NETXUS 14 2,531,379 0.120913 
NETMJP 14 57,557.8 0.0106247 
WHRRPCA 14 • 25.3451 0.219811 
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Table 4.15. Theil's forecast error measures 
Variable N 
Relative 
change 
MSE 
• Decomposition 
Bias 
(UM) 
Regress. 
(UR) 
Disturb. 
(UD) 
Accuracy 
(Ul) 
WHTUOSAS 14 0.0188281 0.00 0.22 0.78 0.0053 
WHFEEC 14 0.00972399 0.01 0.34 0.66 0.0023 
WHFOEC 14 .000049863 0.00 0.09 0,91 0.0001 
WHTUOSAM 14 .000490531 0.00 0.39 0.61 0.0003 
WHACOWE 14 .000960182 0.00 0.01 0.99 0.0000 
WHACCA 14 0.0109719 0.22 0.00 0.78 0.0000 
WHTUCAFU 14 0.00944873 0.00 0.03 0.97 0.0127 
WHTUMAMU 14 0.00258104 0.00 0.56 0.43 0.0011 
WHFEDÂNU 14 0.0943338 0.00 0.08 0.92 0.0061 
WHACIN 14 .000991945 0.36 0.10 0.54 0.0000 
FODINDU 14 0.00468594 0.00 0.49 0.51 0.0015 
WHACUS 14 0.00755224 0.03 0.13 0.84 0.0000 
NETMOSAS 14 0.345383 0.03 0.48 0.49 0.0000 
NETMOSAM 14 0.00151443 0.00 0.21 0.79 0.0000 
WHPDOWE 14 0.00106329 0.01 0.36 0.64 0.0000 
WHPDNCA 14 0.0125675 0.20 0.00 0.80 0.0000 
NETMCAF 14 0.0277725 0.00 0.17 0.83 0.0000 
NETMMAM 14 0.0317104 0.04 0.29 0.67 0.0000 
PRODIND 14 0.00111954 0.36 0.07 0.58 . 0.0000 
WHPDNUS 14 0.00803886 0.03 0.10 0.87 0.0000 
NETXEC 14 26.3388 0.12 0.72 0.16 0.0000 
NETMOWE 14 1.28325 0.04 0.00 0.96 0.0000 
NETMIND 14 5.'8046 9 0.10 0.02 0.87 0.0000 
WHESUS 14 0.0280127 0.01 0.06 0.94 0.0000 
WHPDNAN 14 0.00988658 0.00 0.12 0.88 0.0000 
WHREXPAN 14 0.0409517 0.00 0.29 0.71 0.0019 
NETXAN 14 0.0862862 0.25 0.59 0.16 0.0000 
WHRESPJP 14 0.0141895 0.00 0.34 0.66 0.0000 
WHESTCA 14 0.0197084 0.00 0.03 0.97 0.0000 
WHACANZ 14 0.011983 0.00 0.30 0.69 0.0000 
RGULFUS 14 0.0270072 0.00 0.13 0.87 0.0013 
REFPRICE 14 0.0122761 0.00 0.27 0.73 0.0011 
NETXCA 14 0.0606062 0.05 0.52 0.43 0.0000 
WHESTAN 14 9.33295 0.11 0.54 0.35 0.0000 
WHFEDCA 14 0.0251084 0.00 0.00 0.99 0.0018 
WHFEDDS 14 1.72339 0.01 0.73 0.26 68.6414 
WHRFPUS 14 0.0444878 0.00 0.14 0.86 0.0020 
WHFODJP 14 .000112427 0.00 0.01 0.99 0.0002 
WHREXPCA 14 0.0357732 0.00 0.19 0.81 0.0012 
NETXUS 14 0.0173637 0.05 0.19 0.76 0.0000 
NETMJP 14 .000128232 0.00 0.01 0.99 0.0000 
WHRRPCA 14 0.05536 0.00 0.21 0.79 0.0018 
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Figure 4.2. US farm price, actual and predicted 
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Figure 4.3. US Gulf Port price, actual 
and predicted 
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Figure 4.4. US net exports, actual and predicted 
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Figure 4.5. Australia export price, actual 
and predicted 
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Figure 4. 6. Canada export price, actual 
and predicted 
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Figure 4.7. Canada realized board price, 
actual and predicted 
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Figure 4.8. Australia real effective price, 
actual and predicted 
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and net exports of the U.S. Five out of 14 turning points of both U.S. 
price series are missed, and these points are distributed at the tail 
ends of the series. Four turning points of U.S. net exports series are 
missed. Because Australia and Canada prices are linked to the U.S. gulf 
port price, the pattern of turning points missed for these prices follows 
that of the U.S. prices. The extremely low predicted net exports of the 
U.S. in 1969 is directly related to the rather sharp decline in all 
prices predicted for that year. 
Based on the turning point criterion, the model may be evaluated to 
have about 64 percent accuracy. It does much better when rms errors and 
Theil's statistics of fit are also considered. 
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CHAPTER 3. SIMULATION OF POLICY ALTERNATIVES 
Stochastic Simulation Procedure 
The approach of stochastic simulation is based on the large sample 
theory that the distribution of a sample approaches that of the true 
population as the same size increases. Three reasons put forward 
(McCarthy, 1972) for doing stochastic simulations of econometric models 
include : 
a) to capture business cycles in simulations of econometric models, 
b) economic fluctuations per se may be due to random shocks, and 
c) stochastic simulation provides a means of studying the 
statistical distribution of the endogenous variables and of 
policy predictions. 
The last two reasons are most relevant for the application of 
stochastic simulation in this study. Fluctuations in yields are due to 
random shocks and these yield fluctuations are the basis of the inherent 
instability in the market. Statistical distribution of current and 
alternative price policies is the basis upon which effects of policy 
alternatives on market stability are evaluated, where instability in the 
market is measured by the variability of critical endogenous variables. 
The critical problem in doing a stochastic simulation is applying 
the types of shocks which have the same statistical properties as those 
which affect the system to be simulated. The statistical theory for 
determining the appropriate types of shocks is provided by McCarthy and 
is summarized below. 
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Define S as a 1 x M matrix of pseudo-structural (generated) 
disturbances; r as a 1 x T matrix of random numbers, normally distributed 
with zero means and unit variances; D is any T x M matrix of disturbances 
from T observations of M true structural equations. The M x M covariance 
matrix of the disturbances is Z = -^U'U. Also, it is assumed that r is 
independent of U. S is further specified in terms of U and r as : 
• 1 10 
s = T rU; and the covariance matrix of S is 
Zg = ES'S = -^U'r'rU. 
Since r is a matrix of normal deviates, and is also independent of U, 
may be rewritten as: 
- — —2 —1 '^TT —2 — — —  ^
Although the results hold for known U (the structural disturbances), 
they may be directly extended to an estimated sample of residuals, U, if 
the structural models are estimated by consistent methods. Thus, 
assuming that the model estimators are consistent, the appropriate 
stochastic terms are generated as: 
S = T"^^^rÛ. 
By direct analogy, the conditional covariance of S, given Û is equal to 
the sample covariance matrix of Û. That is, 
Zg = Z = ^ Û'Û. 
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In practice, the covariance matrix t  is obtained with estimation 
results; r is generated by a random number generating computer 
subroutine. Therefore, S has to be computed using r and t. Chowdhury 
and Heady (1980) define S as <j)r, such that 
E( <jn:r' <j)* ) = Z; 
or 
4»E(rr')*' = S; 
and 
(fxj)' = z. 
Since 2 is a symmetric matrix, there is an upper triangular matrix (J) 
such that 
((i*' = Ê. 
<j) is determined using the Cholesky half function, S is thus generated 
from the distribution of TJ which approximates the distribution of the 
true U asymptotically. 
In this study, the stochastic component of the model is yields^ of 
major wheat producing regions; this implies that the other structural 
equations are not subject to any shocks. The set of trend equations of 
yields or production is represented by; 
^For the central planned economies, the stochastic variable is 
production. 
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Y = Tg + U 
where Y = a vector of yields or production, 
T = trend, as an explanatory variable (T=l in 1966, and 15 in 
1980), 
g = a matrix of trend coefficients and intercept .terms, and 
U = a vector of disturbance terms. 
The estimated equation is: 
Y = Tg; 
therefore, 
n = Y - Y 
or 
Û = Y - Tg. 
The estimated covariance matrix of Û is 
®11' ®12' •••» ®19 
^21' ^22' '''> ®29 ' 
S9IJ  • • • J  Sgg 
is estimated variance of residuals of yield equation for region 
and S^j is covariance of residuals between equations of region i and 
Z constructed from the model for nine producing regions is: 
Z = 
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Region 
Can— Aus— 
JQ.S.A. ada tralia India E.G. OWE 
0.018 
0.031 
China U.S.S.R ENE 
0.086 
0.007 
Z = 0.026 
0.003 
1.633x10 13 
1.582x10 14 
1.027x10 13 
Zero covariance of residuals between regions is assumed. 
Twenty sets of random yields are computed for the period 1975-1980 
The choice of twenty simulations is based entirely on cost 
considerations. Table 5.1 compares actual yields (production) to the 
range of simulated values for each year. Actual values of all yield 
variables fall within the range of simulated values. Production 
variables fall outside the simulated values more often, probably because 
unlike yields, residuals of the production equations are not entirely due 
to weather. In the absence of economic explanatory variables for 
production, trend equation is the best alternative way of incorporating 
random shocks in production. However, the mean of simulated values of 
the six-year period compare very closely with the actual means of all 
simulated variables. 
as : 
Y = Tg + S 
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Table 5.1. A comparison of simulated and actual yields (MT/ha) and 
production (MMT): Base model 
Simulated 
Region Year Actual Mean Minimum Maximum 
U.S.A. 
Canada 
Australia 
India 
E.G. 
1975 2 .06 2 .07 1 .87 2 .40 
1976 2 .04 2 .06 1 .79 2 .36 
1977 2 .06 2 .18 1 .97 2 .47 
1978 2 .11 2 .17 1 .95 2 .59 
1979 2 .30 2 .20 1 .91 2 .46 
1980 2 .25 2 .20 1 .97 2 .44 
Average 2 .14 2 .15 
1975 1 .80 1 .80 1 .56 2 .06 
1976 2 .10 1 .80 1 .37 2 .22 
1977 1. 96 1. 84 1 .46 2 .23 
1978 2 .00 2 .17 1 .95 2 .59 
1979 1 .64 2 .87 1 .63 2 .17 
1980 1 .73 1 .82 1 .54 2 .17 
Average 1, .87 1. 88 
1975 1, .31 1, .23 0 .63 1, .70 
1976 1 .32 1 .21 0 .69 1 .78 
1977 1 .17 1, .13 0 .80 1, .43 
1978 0 .91 1 .30 0 .94 1 .74 
1979 1, .61 1, .87 1 .63 2, .17 
1980 0 .99 1 .10 0 .36 1 .70 
Average 1. 22 1. 31 
1975 1. 34 1, .37 1 .24 1, .56 
1976 1 .41 1, .38 1 .15 1, .64 
1977 1. 39 1. 41 1 .25 1. 54 
1978 1, .48 1. 47 1 .32 1. 66 
1979 1. 57 1. 51 1 .35 1. 73 
1980 1, .44 1, .54 1 .41 1. 70 
Average 1, .44 1. 45 
1975 3, .64 3. 97 3 .70 4, .27 
1976 3, .49 3, .81 3 .43 4, .04 
1977 3. 82 3. 86 3 .65 4, .24 
1978 4, .33 3, .98 3 .70 4, .26 
1979 4, ,21 4. 19 3 .76 4, .44 
1980 4, .49 4. 49 4 .25 4, .69 
Average 4. 00 4. .05 
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Table 5.1. continued 
Simulated 
Region Year Actual Mean Minimum Maximum 
Other West Europe 
U.S.S.R. 
China 
East Europe 
1975 2.11 2.03 1.77 2.36 
1976 2.21 2.08 1.69 2.34 
1977 1.94 2.17 1.89 2.45 
1978 2.25 2.23 1.90 2.45 
1979 2.07 2.31 2.03 2.56 
1980 2.61 2.36 2.16 2.69 
Average 2.20 2.20 
1975 66.2 95.1 78.5 108.4 
1976 96.9 92.8 73.3 106.7 
1977 92.2 95.4 80.7 113.4 
1978 120.8 97.1 84.1 111.7 
1979 90.2 97.2 85.0 117.4 
1980 98.2 95.7 79.6 115.8 
Average 94.2 95.6 
1975 41.0 43.5 41.7 45.9 
1976 50.5 46.4 44.0 48.7 
1977 41,0 48.6 45.5 50.6 
1978 54.0 51.3 49.8 53.5 
1979 62.7 53.6 51.8 55.6 
1980 54.2 56.1 53.9 58.4 
Average 50.6 49.9 
1975 28.7 31.7 25.1 37.7 
1976 35.0 32.5 24.0 38.8 
1977 34.6 32.6 28.1 38.4 
1978 35.9 33.3 27.4 39.9 
1979 27.6 37.2 28.5 39.9 
1980 34.5 33.7 27.5 38.3 
Average 32.7 33.5 
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Alternative Policy Simulations 
Four different alternatives of the model are simulated. These 
include the base model which represents current wheat market structure. 
The second alternative simulates the model with a nonstochastic Soviet 
production. Schwartz and Blandford raised concern of the effect of 
Soviet production variability on the changing structure of wheat trade. 
Since there is no price adjustment in the Soviet market, part of the 
instability in Soviet production is transmitted outside through net 
trade. The other two alternatives allow for perfect price transmission 
into the E.G. and India. In addition, price levels in these regions are 
adjusted to comparable levels in the world market. 
Nonstochastic Soviet Production 
To simulate the effect of Soviet production variability on market 
stability cf the rest of the world, the random component of Soviet 
production is suppressed so that the new levels and variability of 
production and net trade in the U.S.S.R. correspond to the estimated 
values. Results of this simulation are presented in Table 5.2. 
The column of percent change in mean shows very little change in the 
level of all the endogenous variables, but net imports of the Soviet 
Union. An 0.8 percent increase in Soviet production over the base 
simulation reduces net imports by 8.5 percent, which translates to a 1.6 
percent reduction in U.S. net exports. 
Production variability in the Soviet Onion over the six-year period 
is reduced by 79 percent; there is no within-year variability. The 
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Table 5.2a. Effect of Soviet production variability on market stability 
Base Nons tochastic Soviet production 
% % 
Variable Mean S.D. C.V. Mean S.D. C.V. mean S.D. 
WHRFPUS 98 25.5 26.0 97.4 22.2 22.8 -0.6 -12.9 
RGULFUS 123.2 28.1 22.8 122.2 24.5 20.0 —0.8 -12.8 
NETXUS 31.9 15.4 48.4 31.4 14.1 44.9 -1.6 -8.4 
WHREXPCA 158.0 46.9 29.7 156.4 42.4 27.1 -1.0 -9.6 
WHRRPCA 129.0 41.3 32.0 127.6 37.3 29.2 -1.1 -9.7 
NETXCA 13.5 4.1 30.4 13.5 4.1 30.1 0 0 
WHREXPAUS 93.0 25.4 27.3 92.0 22.0 23.9 -1.1 -13.4 
REFPRICE 113.5 34.5 30.4 112.2 29.9 26.9 -1.1 -13.3 
NETXAUS 9.7 3.3 33.6 9.7 3.2 32.6 -3.0 -3.0 
WHPDNUSR 95.6 8.2 8-6 96.4 1.7 1.78 +0.8 79.0 
NETMUSR 7.1 12.9 181.7 6.5 10.7 165.3 -8.5 17.1 
Definitions 
WHRFPDS = U.S. real farm price (U.S. $/MT); 
RGULFUS = U.S. gulf port price, fob (U.S. $/MT); 
NETXUS = U.S. net exports (million MT) ; 
WHREXPCA = Canada, export price, fob (Can $/MT); 
WHRKPCA = Canada, realized board price (Can $/MT); 
NETXCA = Canada, net exports (million MT); 
WHREXPAUS = Australia, export price, fob (Aus $/MT); 
REFPRICE = Australia, real effective price (Aus $/MT); 
NETXAUS = Australia, net exports (million MT); 
WHPDNUSR = U.S.S.R. production (million MT); and 
NETMUSR = U.S.S.R. net imports (million MT). 
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Table 5.2b. Effect of U.S.S.R. production variability on world wheat 
market stability: Annual comparison 
Nonstochastic 
Base model Soviet production 
Variable Year Mean S.D. C.V. Mean S.D. C.V. 
U.S.S.R. production 1975 95.1 8.2 8.6 93.9 
(million metric tons) 1976 92.8 9.9 10.7 94.9 
1977 95.4 8.0 8.4 95.9 
1978 97.1 6.3 6.4 96.9 
1979 97.2 7.8 8.1 97.8 
1980 95.7 9.0 9.5 98.9 
Average 95.6 8-2 96.4 
S.D. (mean) 1.5 1.7 
U.S. net exports 1975 6.2 5.2 83.0 6.9 2.9 42.0 
(million metric tons) 1976 37.3 7.6 20.4 35.9 4.1 11.5 
1977 30.8 5.8 18.9 30.7 3.3 10.9 
1978 48.0 5.9 12.4 48.3 3.3 6.8 
1979 23.9 5.6 23.523.4 4.3 18.4 
1980 45.4 7.3 16.0 43.4 3.4 7.9 
Average 31.9 6.2 31.4 3.6 
S.D. (mean) 14.1 13-6 
U.S. gulf port price 1975 90-9 15.6 17.2 92.9 10.1 10.9 
(U.S. $) 1976 130.2 20.4 15.6 127.3 13.4 10.5 
1977 128.4 14.6 11-4 127-1 9.1 7.2 
1978 156.0 17.6 11.3 157.3 11.6 7.3 
1979 98.0 19.5 19.9 98.0 14.6 14.9 
1980 135.4 15.3 11.3 130.6 9.0 6.9 
Average 123.1 17.2 122.2 11.3 
S.D. (mean) 22-3 21-6 
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immediate effect of the reduction in production variability is a 17 
percent decrease in Soviet net import variability. U.S. net exports 
variability falls by eight percent, while price variability falls by 
nearly 13 percent. Prices in Canada are nine percent more stable. The 
variabilities of the export price and real effective price in Australia 
fall by 13 percent. The above changes refer to year-to-year variability. 
Variability within the year refers to the deviations from expected levels 
for that year. The average deviation from expected prices for each year 
is the simple average of the within-year variability. By this measure, 
variability in U.S. prices falls by 34 percent (Table 5.2b). 
Simulation Results of Alternative E.G. Price Policies 
Current E.G. prices are almost twice the world price level and the 
standard deviation of the E.G. price between 1975 and 1980 was 8.3 ECUs, 
compared to 17.1 for the U.S. gulf port price. So, the E.G. not only 
favors producers in their pricing, the prices are also very stable, not 
varying with prices in the rest of the world. The difference between the 
threshold price and Rotterdam price is a levy or export restitution, 
which is what varies as prices outside the E.G. vary. The two 
alternative policies simulated are first allowing current price level in 
the E.G. to vary with the world price, and second, set the E.G. price 
level and variability to equal world price level and variability. 
To allow the threshold price to vary with the Rotterdam price, which 
is the world price in the E.G., the threshold price is recomputed as the 
sum of an approximate variable levy, and the Rotterdam price, where the 
136 
average levy is the difference between the threshold price and the 
Rotterdam price. Rotterdam price is then endogenized by linkage with the 
U.S. gulf port price. 
Results of the scenario are summarized in Table 5.3. The linkage 
results in a one percent decline in the level of the threshold price. 
The decline is actually the difference between the actual and estimated 
threshold price. In fact, this scenario is not expected to change the 
level of any variable. Therefore, the 0.7 million tons decrease in 
E.G. net exports, the subsequent 0.7 million tons increase in U.S. net 
exports, and a five cent increase in the U.S. gulf port price are the 
effects of the one percent difference between actual and estimated 
threshold price. What is expected to change is the stability in 
E.G. prices. The variability of expected prices over the six-year period 
doubles from a standard deviation of 8.9 EGU. The average standard 
deviation of the within-year variability is 7.2 ECU. This standard 
deviation is a measure of the random nature of prices for any given year. 
Stochastic nature of prices does not compound that of production because 
there is only a 0.1 increase in the average within-year standard 
deviation of production over the base model. In fact, year-to—year 
varaibility of production in this scenario falls by about five percent. 
\ 
The effect of higher price instability in the E.G. seems to fall largely 
on E.G. trade. The annual variability in E.G. net trade increases from a 
standard deviation of 3.5 MMT to 4.8 MMT. The average within—year 
standard deviation of net exports increases by 56 percent. The effect of 
increased price response in the E.G. on the world market is represented 
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Table 5.3. Impact on market instability of a fixed tariff policy in the 
E.G. 
Endogenous 
Base model threshold price 
Variable Year Mean S.D. C.V. Mean S.D. C.V. 
E.G. price (ECU) 
E.G. production 
(million metric tons) 
E.G. food demand (kg) 
E.G. net exports 
(million metric tons) 
1975 247.0 0 0 240.5 1.5 0.6 
1976 243.5 0 0 205.8 9-1 4.4 
1977 236.3 0 0 257.3 10.6 4.1 
1978 228.1 0 0 237.7 6.5 2.7 
1979 224.8 0 0 235.4 8.1 3.5 
1980 224.2 0 0 210.6 7.5 3.6 
Average 234.0 231.2 7.2 
S.D. (mean) 8.9 17.8 
1975 41.6 1.6 3.9 41.1 1.6 3.9 
1976 42.8 1.7 4.0 40.0 1.9 4.7 
1977 38.9 1.6 4.1 40.3 1.8 4.3 
1978 43.7 1.5 3.4 44.5 1.5 3.5 
1979 46.2 2.0 4.3 47.1 2.0 4.2 
1980 52-2 1.4 2.8 51.0 1.5 3.0 
Average 44.2 1.6 44.0 1.7 
S.D. (mean) 4.2 4.0 
1975 109.1 0 0 109.5 0.1 0.1 
1976 109.0 0 0 111.5 0.7 0.6 
1977 108.5 0 0 107.7 0.6 0.6 
1978 108.1 0 0 107.7 0.3 0.3 
1979 108.4 0 0 107.8 0.5 0.4 
1980 108.8 0 0 109.4 0.7 0.6 
Average 108-7 108.9 0.5 
S.D. (mean) 0.4 1.4 
1975 5.6 1.6 28.9 4.3 1.7 39.2 
1976 2.2 1.7 77.7 -6.1 2.8 -45.3 
1977 0.3 1.6 584.1 3.9 3.0 77.3 
1978 0.4 1.5 400.0 2.4 2.1 84.6 
1979 6.5 2.0 30.7 8.9 2.6 28.9 
1980 9-9 1.4 14.6 7.4 2.5 34.0 
Average 4-2 1.6 3.5 2.5 
S.D- (mean) 3.5 4.8 
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Table 5.3. continued 
Endogenous 
Base model threshold price 
Variable Year Mean S.D. C.V. Mean S.D. C.V. 
U.S. net exports 
(million metric tons). 
U.S. gulf port price 
(U.S. $) 
1975 6.2 5.2 83.0 7.1 4.9 68.4 
1976 37.3 7.6 20.4 43.6 7.5 17.3 
1977 30.8 5.8 18.9 27.0 6.3 23.3 
1978 48.0 5.9 12.4 47.2 6.2 13.2 
1979 23.9 5.6 23.5 22.9 5.9 25.7 
1980 45.4 7.3 16.0 47.7 7.7 16.1 
Average 31.9 6.2 32.6 
S.D. (mean) 14.1 14.9 
1975 90.9 15.6 17.2 93.5 15.0 16.0 
1976 130.7 20.4 15.6 147.2 19.7 13.4 
1977 128.4 14.6 11.4 118.9 13.8 11.6 
1978 156.0 17.6 11.3 145.7 16.2 13.6 
1979 98.0 19.5 19.9 92.9 17.5 18.9 
1980 135.4 15.3 11.3 143.9 14.9 10.3 
Average 123.2 17.2 123.7 16.2 
S.D. (mean) 22.3 23.6 
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by changes in variability of U.S. net exports and gulf port price. Both 
annual and within-year variability of U.S. net exports are slightly 
higher in this scenario than variabilities in the base simulation. 
Similarly, the annual variability of mean prices (standard deviation of 
means) increases by six percent over the base simulation. But, the 
random variability (average of within-year standard deviations) is six 
percent lower. This implies a lower probability of large deviations in 
expected prices within year, but more variability in expected prices from 
year to year. 
The second simulation, which involves lowering the E.G. price level 
while making it more responsive to world price changes, is expected to 
affect price and quantity levels, as well as their stability. The new 
E.G. price level is the Rotterdam price; this assumes zero levies or 
export restitutions. This means a 56 percent reduction in E.G. prices, 
and over 150 percent increase in the variability of annual expected 
prices. Results of this simulation are presented in Table 5.4. 
E.G. production level falls by 22 percent, corresponding to the yield 
price elasticity of 0.4. Within—year average production variability is 
higher than the base simulation; this increases the variability in net 
trade, therefore offsetting any gains in stability of U.S. net exports, 
and therefore world price. 
U.S. net export demand increases by 10.3 MMT because of a shift of 
E.G. from net export to net import position. To account for differences 
in levels between base and alternative model, the coefficient of varia­
tion is used as the measure of variability; and by this measure, U.S. net 
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Table 5.4. Impact on market instability of border pricing policy in the 
E.G. 
Endogenous 
Base model threshold price 
Variable Year Mean S.D. G.V. Mean S.D. C.V. 
E.G. price (ECU) 1975 247.0 0 0 137.1 1.5 1.1 
1976 243.5 0 0 75.6 9.2 12.1 
1977 236.3 0 0 125.7 10.7 8.5 
1978 228.1 0 0 106.7 6.8 6.4 
1979 224.8 0 0 109.1 8.4 7.7 
1980 224.2 0 0 70.4 7 .8 11.0 
Average 234.0 104.1 7.4 
S.D. (mean) 8.9 24.3 
E.G. production 1975 41.6 1.6 3.9 34.0 1.6 4.7 
(million metric tons) 1976 42.8 1.7 4.0 30.7 1.9 6.2 
1977 38.9 1.6 4.1 31.2 1.8 5.6 
1978 43.7 1.5 3.4 34.1 1.6 4.7 
1979 46.2 2.0 4.3 36.9 2.0 5.4 
1980 52.2 1.4 2.8 38.8 1.6 4.0 
Average 44.2 1.6 34.3 1.8 
• S.D. (mean) - 4.2 2.9 
E.G. food demand (kg) 1975 109.1 0 0 108.7 0.08 0.7 
- 1976 109.0 0 0 113.4 0.90 0.8 
1977 108.5 0 0 109.5 0.6 0.6 
1978 108.1 0 0 110.0 0.5 0.4 
1979 108.4 0 0 109.3 0.6 0.5 
1980 108.8 0 0 112.5 0.8 0.7 
Average 108.7 110.6 0.6 
S.D. (mean) 0.4 1.7 
E.G. net exports 1975 5.6 1.6 28.9 -0.9 1.6 --173.3 
(million metric tons) 1976 2.2 1.7 77 .7 -19.1 2.8 -14.8 
1977 0.3 1.6 584.1 -10.1 2.8 -27.6 
1978 0.4 1.5 400.0 -13.8 2.2 -15.9 
1979 6.5 2.0 30.6 -5.1 2.5 -49.1 
1980 . 9.9 1.4 14.6 -10.4 2.3 -22.5 
Average 4.2 1.6 -9.9 2.4 
S.D. (mean) 3.5 5.8 
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Table 5.4. continued 
Endogenous 
Base model threshold price 
Variable Year Mean S.D. C.V. Mean S.D. C.V. 
U.S. net exports 1975 6.2 5.2 83.0 11.2 5.0 44.2 
(million metric tons) 1976 37.3 7.6 20.4 52.9 7.7 14.5 
1977 30.8 5.8 18.9 36.3 6.5 17.8 
1978 48.0 5.9 12.4 58.6 6.3 10.7 
1979 23.9 5.6 23.5 32,7 6.0 18.3 
1980 45.4 7.3 16.0 61.3 7 .6 12.5 
Average 31.9 6.2 42.2 6.5 
S.D. (mean) 14.1 17.5 
U.S. gulf port price 1975 90.9 15.6 17.2 104.1 15.0 14.5 
(U.S. $) 1976 130.2 20.4 15.6 172.5 20.1 11.6 
1977 128.4 14.6 11.4 141.1 14.5 10.3 
1978 156.0 17.6 11.3 163.2 18.1 11.1 
1979 98.0 19.5 19.9 100.8 18.1 18.0 
1980 135.4 15.3 11.3 153.3 14.8 9.4 
Average 123.1 17.2 139.2 
oo (O r—1 
S.D. (mean) 22.3 27.7 
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trade instability falls in all years. The gulf port price level 
increases by an average of 13 percent as a result of the higher net 
export demand. The overall coefficient of variation (ratio of average 
standard deviation to average means) is 13 percent lower than the base 
simulation price variability. The stability of world price in this 
scenario would be greater without the offsetting effects of increased 
production instability introduced from abroad through the assumed price 
1inkage. 
Usually, governments try to minimize annual variability in prices 
when they set prices. Taking the standard deviation of the means of all 
variables in the tables, neither of the two alternative scenarios of the 
E.G. serves this purpose. But, if the objectJLve is to reduce the 
probability of large deviation of prices from their expected levels given 
some exogenous shock, then a lower and more responsive E.G. price may be 
desirable, but only to net exporters such as the U.S., whose price levels 
are also boosted. 
Simulation Results of Alternative India Price Policies 
Since 1974, the internal price level in India has been below the 
world price, and like the E.G., the price does not respond to changes in 
world market conditions. The first alternative policy simulation 
involves allowing a linkage between India's internal price and the 
U.S. gulf port price. Results of the simulation are presented in 
Table 5.5. The average price level in India is not expected to change 
but the standard deviation of the mean annual prices increases by 40 
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Table 5.5. Impact on market instability of a fixed subsidy policy in 
India 
Endogenous 
Base model India price 
Variable. Year Mean S.D. C.V. Mean S.D. C.V. 
India price ($/MT) 
India production 
(million metric tons) 
India demand (kg) 
India net exports 
(million metric tons) 
1975 165.9 0 0 165.9 0 0 
1976 118.7 0 0 89.9 1 .4 1.5 
1977 128.3 0 0 151.9 1.0 0.6 
1978 122.8 0 0 140.9 0.9 0.6 
1979 118.1 0 0 139.3 1.1 0.8 
1980 115.5 0 0 92.8 1 .1 1.1 
Average 128.2 130.1 0.9 
S.D. (mean) 17.3 28.7 
1975 24.5 1.5 6.2 24.4 1.5 6.2 
1976 28.0 2.2 7.9 27.0 2.1 7.9 
1977 28.8 1.8 6.4 28.1 1.9 6.7 
1978 30.4 1.7 5.6 29.9 1 .7 5.9 
1979 32.3 1.9 6.0 32.0 1.9 5.9 
1980 33.3 1.8 5.5 32.5 1.6 5.0 
Average 29.6 1.8 29.0 1.8 
S.D. (mean) 2.9 2.8 
1975 47.4 0 0 47.4 0 0 
1976 47.2 0 0 58.9 2 .6 4.4 
1977 48.9 0 0 42.6 3.3 7.7 
1978 49.6 0 0 45.9 2.4 5.2 
1979 50.6 0 0 44.9 3.0 6.7 
1980 52.6 0 0 58.3 2.9 5.1 
Average 49.6 49.7 2.4 
S.D. (mean) 1.8 6.5 
1975 8.1 1.5 18.7 8.2 1.5 18.3 
1976 6.5 2.2 34.1 14.7 2.7 18-5 
1977 0.2 1.8 797.8 -3.0 3.1 -102.6 
1978 -0.9 1.7 -186.9 -2.7 2.5 -90.3 
1979 0.1 1.9 1950.0 -3.4 2.8 -80.7 
1980 —0 .6 1.8 -311.1 4.0 2.7 67.2 
Average 2.2 1.8 3.0 2.6 
S.D. (mean) 3.6 6.7 
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Endogenous 
Base model India price 
Variable Year Mean S.D. C.V. Mean S.D. C.V. 
U.S. net exports 1975 6.2 5.2 83.0 6.3 5.2 82.4 
(million metric tons) 1976 37.3 7.6 20.4 45.0 7.8 17.3 
1977 30.8 5.8 18.9 29.8 6.5 21.9 
1978 48.0 5.9 12.4 49.5 6.4 12.9 
1979 23.9 5.6 23.5 24.2 6.2 25.4 
1980 45.4 7.3 16.0 52.3 7.7 14.8 
Average 31.9 6.2 34.5 6.6 
S.D. (mean) 14.1 16.3 
U.S. gulf port price 1975 90.9 15.6 17.2 91.2 15.6 17.1 
(U.S. $) 1976 130.2 20.4 15.6 150.7 20.5 13.6 
1977 128.4 14.6 11.4 127.4 15.3 11.9 
1978 156.0 17.6 11.3 151.6 18.5 12.2 
1979 98.0 19.5 19.9 93.0 18.3 19.7 
1980 135.4 15.3 11.3 150.2 15.0 10.0 
——— 6— — 123 17.2 127^4 - 1 
CM 
S.D. (mean) 22.3 26.3 
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percent. Production variability does not change probably because of the 
low supply elasticity (0.12). The standard deviation of food demand, 
which has a high price elasticity, increases from 1.8 kg at the base to 
6.5 kg. Demand also becomes a random variable because price is 
stochastic. The effect is a higher within-year variability in net trade 
from the base simulation. But, net imports of 3 million tons is not 
enough to significantly affect the stability in U.S. net exports, and the 
gulf port price. 
The second scenario of India price policy assumes world price 
transmission into India, and that the price level is equivalent to the 
world price. The internal price is replaced by India's border price, 
equal to the unit value of imports. The border price is in turn linked 
to the U.S. gulf port price. Results of the scenario are presented in 
Table 5.6. 
Internal price in India increases from $128.2 to $183.9 and the 
annual variability doubles. Production level increases by only eight 
percent while the annual variability increases from a standard deviation 
of 2.9 to 5.1 million tons (75 percent increase). The average of the 
yearly standard deviations increases by 11 percent. 
Demand level falls by 14 million tons, while annual variability 
increases from a standard deviation of 1.9 kg to 9.8 kg. Lower demand 
plus slightly higher production increases India's net supply and, 
beginning in 1977, India exports wheat, adding 9.2 million tons to net 
supply of the world. 
As a residual supplier, U.S. net exports fall by an average of 5.9 
million tons. The lower demand for U.S. exports lowers world price by 
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Table 5.6. Impact on market instability of border pricing policy in 
India 
Endogenous 
Base model India price 
Variable Year Mean S.D. C.V. Mean S.D. C.V. 
India price (U.S. $) 
India production 
(million metric tons) 
India demand (kg) 
India net imports 
(million metric tons) 
1975 165.9 0 0 172.0 0 0 
1976 118.7 0 0 134.2 0.09 7.0 
1977 128.3 0 0 184.8 0.12 6.7 
1978 122.8 0 0 235.6 0.10 3.9 
1979 118.1 0 0 216.9 0.11 5.1 
1980 115.5 0 0 160.0 0.11 6.7 
Average 128.2 183.9 .09 
S.D. (mean) 17.3 34.0 
1975 24.5 1.5 6.2 24.5 1.5 6.2 
1976 28.0 2.2 7.9 28.0 2.2 7.9 
1977 28.8 1.8 6.4 29.6 2.0 6.6 
1978 30.4 1.7 5.6 33.3 1.9 5.7 
1979 32.3 1.9 6,0 37.2 2.2 5.8 
1980 33.3 1.8 5.5 39.0 2.0 5.0 
Average 29.5 1.8 31.9 2.0 
S.D. (mean) 2.9 5.1 
1975 47.4 0 0 45.8 0 0 
1976 47.2 0 0 46.0 2.6 5.7 
1977 48.9 0 0 34.2 3.2 9.5 
1978 49.6 0 0 21.4 2.4 11.3 
1979 50.6 0 0 24.1 3.0 12.4 
1980 52.6 0 0 40.7 2.9 7.0 
Average 49.4 35.4 2.4 
S.D. (mean) 1.9 
1975 8.1 1.5 18.7 7.1 1.5 21.2 
1976 6.5 2.2 34.1 5.8 2.8 48.0 
1977 0.2 1.8 797.8 -9-9 3.1 -31.0 
1978 -0.9 1.7 -186.8 -21.8 2.6 -11.9 
1979 0.10 1.9 1950.0 -22.0 2.9 -13.3 
1980 -0 .6 1.8 -311.1 -14.2 2.9 -20.2 
Average 2.2 1.8 -9.2 2.6 
S.D. (mean) 3.6 11.8 
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Base model 
Endogenous 
India price 
Variable Year Mean S.D. C.V. Mean S.D. C.V. 
U.S. net exports 1975 6.2 5.2 83.0 5.5 5.2 94.8 
(million metric tons) 1976 37.3 7.6 20.4 38.3 7.8 20.3 
1977 30.8 5.8 18.9 25.5 6.5 25.5 
1978 48.0 5.9 12.4 35.5 6.3 17.8 
1979 23.9 5.6 23-5 11.8 6.1 51.8 
1980 45.4 7.3 16.0 39.5 7.6 19.2 
Average 31.9 6.2 26.0 6.5 
S.D. (mean) 14.1 13.2 
U.S. gulf port price 1975 90.9 15.6 17.2 89.0 15.6 17.5 
(U.S. $) 1976 130.2 20.4 15.6 133.0 20.4 15.3 
1977 128.4 14.6 11.4 115.6 15.3 13.3 
1978 156.0 17.6 11.3 122.6 18.3 14.9 
1979 98.0 19.5 19.9 69,3 17.8 25.6 
1980 135.4 15.3 11.3 135.3 14.7 10.9 
S 
Average 
•D. (mean) 
123.1 
22.3 
17.2 110.8 
24.0 
17.0 
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about ten percent. Higher internal demand instability in India raises 
instability of India's annual net trade. Again because of the 
differences in levels between the base model and this scenario, the 
coefficient of variation within years is used as the measure of price 
uncertainty. This statistic is computed as the ratio of the average 
standard deviation and the overall mean. The statistic for India net 
trade falls from 81 percent in the base simulation to 28 percent in the 
alternative scenario. Although levels of U.S. net exports and the gulf 
port price are lower, the standard deviation of the variables (within 
year) remain unchanged and, therefore, the average coefficients of 
variation are much higher. World price is nine percent more variable, 
and the coefficient of variation of U.S. net exports increases by 32 
percent. 
These results of a higher and more responsive price in India 
indicate a greater impact on levels rather than stability of trade 
variables. Because of a high demand elasticity, the higher internal 
price lowers India demand enough to depress world prices. The higher 
prices and higher demand variability are not in favor of consumers. For 
producers, production increases only slightly, with no gains or losses in 
stability over the base. Although it is possible that the lower world 
price can feed back to lower prices in India in the long run, this 
scenario is certainly not preferable over the current situation. 
In fact, of the four alternative scenarios simulated, only the 
scenario of lower and responsive prices in the E.G. may be preferable 
over the base, in terms of lower world price instability. 
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CHAPTER 6. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
The first objective of this study is to identify regions in the 
world wheat mearket whose internal prices are insulated from changes in 
the world price. This is achieved through equations linking the regional 
prices to the world price. Hypotheses tests on the significance of the 
intercept terms and the coefficients of the world price shows widespread 
intervention among regions in world wheat trade. Out of 16 regions, only 
three (including the U.S.) have uninsulated prices, with elasticities of 
transmission greater than 0.5. The results of the linkage equation 
determine which regions are endogenized in the wheat trade model, 
developed as a second objective. — 
The trade model specified includes 16 regions, five net exporting 
and 11 net importing regions. The model is nonspatial and in partial 
equilibrium because it involves trade in wheat alone. It is a nonlinear 
system of demand and supply behavioral equations and identities, and is 
estimated by two—stage least squares, using data series from 1966 to 
1980. Because of the small number of observations relative to the number 
of exogenous variables in the model, ten principal components of the 
exogenous variables are used for the first-stage estimation. 
Internal supply and demand equations are estimated for the U.S., 
Canada, Australia, India, and the E.G. Stock equations are also 
specified for the U.S., Canada, and Australia. Only an area equation is 
estimated for Other West Europe as a region, while demand equations are 
estimated for all other regions. Estimates of the behavioral parameters 
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are reasonable in general. Area and demand elasticities are sumamrized 
in Tables 6.1 and 6.2. There are no price variables in demand equations 
for the U.S.S.R., China, and East Europe, because of lack of price 
information. In these regions, demand is determined by production and 
income. 
The final objective of the study is to determine how much of the 
variability in world wheat market is due to production variability in the 
U.S.S.R., and price insualtion policies in the E.G. and India. Market 
instability is measured as price variability over time, and uncertainty 
about price for a given year. This objective is achieved through 
stochastic simulations of the model. Stochastic terms are generated 
using the distributional properties of the residual^ of production or 
yield trend equations. Zero correlation of residuals across regions is 
assumed. Twenty simulations are performed for each of five alternatives, 
and the base model. The alternatives include two levels of price 
insulation each for the E.G. and India, and suppression of the stochastic 
term on the production equation of the U.S.S.R. 
Results of the suppressing production variability in the U.S.S.R. 
show a 13 percent decline in world price variability over time, and more 
than a 30 percent decline in price level uncertainty of a given year. 
Both the E.G. and India have insulated domestic prices which are either 
higher (in the E.G.) or lower (in India) than the world price. The first 
set of experiments allows a linkage between the world price and the 
internal prices, at the latter's current levels. This linkage is 
equivalent to a fixed tariff in the E.G. or fixed subsidy on imports in 
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Table 6.1. Summary of estimated area harvested elasticities 
Region Wheat 
Elasticity with respect to price of: 
Barley Sorghum Rice 
U.S.A. 0.45 - -0.41 -
Canada 0.35 -0.43 - -
Australia 0.75 -0.48 - -
Other West Europe 0.95 -0.45 - -
India 0.13 - - -0.49 
Tab le 6.2. Sunmary of estimated den^n^ 
Elasticity with respect to price of: 
Income 
Region Wheat Barley Sorghum Rice Corn elasticity 
U.S.A.a 
-7.93 - 7.15 - - 1.36 
Australia® 
- 1.56 - - - 0.96 
India^ -0.78 - - 0.34 - 0.13 
Japan^ -0.06 - - —0.06 - -
Central 
Africa® -1.13 - - - 0.82 2.23 
Other South 
America -0.20 - - - 0.07 -
E.C.b 
-0.06 - - - - —0.06 
^Feed demand. 
^Food demand. 
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India. For each of these experiments, impact on stability of both 
internal demand and supply, and trade variables is either marginal or 
negative. The second set of experiments adjusts internal price levels to 
their world market price equivalents, thereby effectively increasing the 
response of internal prices to world market price changes. The 
adjustment in price levels stimulates adjustments in internal demand and 
supply, thus complicating the choice between stability and instability. 
In the E.G., producers have to trade higher prices and production 
for lower annual production variability. Food demand increases by only 
1.7 percent because of a low demand elasticity of -0.06. Also, the 
higher annual variability in price increases food use variability. The 
impact on level and uncertainty of world price is more desirable. 
— * — * * 
Exporters receive higher prices vdxile importers face a lower uncertainty 
about the price they pay. This also means a reduced price risk for 
producers in the U.S., Canada, and Australia, who have uninsulated wheat 
markets. 
In India, the current price policy favors consumers, who also have a 
high demand elasticity. When price level is adjusted upwards, it is 
consumers ^ o make sacrifices in the form of lower consumption and higher 
consumption variability. There are no gains in production varaibility, 
and external market price is not stabilized ^ither, although both world 
price and level of U.S. exports fall. The results of altering price 
insulation level in India do not seem to conform to the theoretical 
conclusion that an incrase in the elasticity of price transmission lowers 
world price instability. The reason for the results obtained here is 
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that linking the price in India to the world price increases the annual 
variability in India's internal price, and in production and consumption. 
However, variability in net imports does not decline because production 
and consumption are not responding to the same price changes. Production 
responds to a lagged price \Aiile consumption adjusts to current price. 
Theoretically, the stabilizing effects of adjustments in consumption and 
production, ^ Aiere production responds to a lagged price, is 
indeterminate. In this model, the adjustments happen to compound the 
variability in net imports, and hence the world price. 
Conclusions 
î^sults in this study cqnfim that ^  
the Soviet Union is large enough to add to the instability of prices in 
the world market; therefore, the U.S.S.R. cannot be excluded in any 
international efforts to reduce market instability. The variable levy 
policy on grains in the E.G. is responsible for overproduction in the 
region, and lower world price levels. Removal of the levy raises prices, 
and lowers annual price instability as well as price uncertainty for each 
year. These effects are desirable to net exporting regions but may not 
be to nonproducing importing regions, if they consider lower price levels 
more important than reduced price uncertainty. For net importers who 
also produce wheat, higher world prices are likely to increase their 
internal production depending on whether their internal prices are 
uninsulated, and their supply response elasticities. In the long-run. 
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higher production in all wheat producing regions can lower prices to all 
trading regions. 
The high demand elasticity relative to supply elasticity in India 
makes the losses to consumers much larger than the gains to producers. 
The ineffectiveness of a higher price transmission elasticity in India on 
world price stability indicates that the nature of internal supply and 
demand functions, such as the presence of a lagged price in the supply 
function for India, are equally important in determining adjustments in 
net trade and, therefore, the impact on external market instability. 
Theoretical derivations assume that both supply and demand adjust to 
current prices. In reality, this is not always true. 
Simulations performed with this model are restricted to the 
historical period of 1975 to 1980. Since the validation statistics 
indicate that the model reproduces the historical time paths quite well, 
the model can be used in future research to forecast beyond the 
estimation period. Time limitations did not permit such forecasts in 
this study. Also, more estimation needs to be made on the internal 
demand and supply of the developing regions, the U.S.S.R. and Eastern 
Europe, as more information becomes available. In this model, the 
endogenous regions with interdependent prices are the major exporting 
countries of the U.S., Canada, and Australia. This is realistic because 
world supply of wheat is indeed concentrated in these countries and they 
have little or no price insulation. The model can be improved by 
including more detailed models of the internal markets of Argentina and 
of importing regions. 
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Finally, the error structure used to generate stochastic terms can 
be expanded to included errors in all equations, as well as possible 
correlations between regions. 
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APPENDIX A. LIST OF COUNTRIES/REGIONS IN STUDY 
I. Wheat exporting regions 
United States of America 
Canada 
Australia 
Argentina 
European Economic Community (EEC-9) (Denmark, West Germany, 
France, Belgium-Luxemburg, 
Italy, Ireland, United 
Kingdom, and Netherlands) 
II. Wheat importing regions 
Other West Europe (Austria, Switzerland, Sweden, Spain, 
Ireland, Portugal) 
Japan 
India 
Soviet Union 
People's Republic of China 
Middle America (Costa Rica, Guatemala, Honduras, Haiti, Mexico, 
Nicaragua, Panama, El Salvador, Trinidad) 
Other South America (Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, 
Paraguay, Surinam, Peru, Uruguay) 
Central Africa (Ivory Coast, Cameroons, Ethiopia, Ghana, 
Nigeria, Senegal, Somalia, Zaire, Sierra Leone) 
Other South Asia (Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Pakistan) 
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East Europe (Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Poland, 
Hungary, Albania, Bulgaria, Romania) 
Rest-of-the-world (East Asia, North Africa and Middle East, 
Brazil, Venezuela, East Africa, Thailand, 
Indonesia, South East Asia, South Africa) 
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APPENDIX B. PLOTS OF EXCHANGE RATES AND PRICES 
SUPPORTING PRICE LINKAGES 
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Figure B.45- Iraq parity price and Rotterdam price 
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Figure B-46... Saudi Arabia nominal exchange rate 
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Figure B.47. Saudi Arabia real exchange rate 
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Figure B.48. Saudi Arabia parity price and 
Rotterdam price 
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Figure B.49. East Africa regional price and Rotterdam price 
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Figure B.50. Kenyp nominal exchange rate 
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Figure B.6l. Kenya real exchange rate 
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Figure B.52. Kenya parity price and Rotterdam price 
